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Riassunto 
Lo scopo di questo elaborato è di proporre un metodo che permetta il calcolo del rischio di incidenti 
rilevanti in serbatori costruiti su di una zona sismica. Partendo dall’analisi dell’albero dei guasti, 
unitamente alla conoscenza delle distribuzioni probabilistiche è possibile ottenere le distribuzioni di 
probabilità di guasto per l’apparato meccanico coinvolto, grazie all’uso di un programma di calcolo. 
Questi dati sono, dunque, compatibili con quelli che è possibile ottenere dall’analisi sismica: 
attraverso la matrice di distribuzione dei terremoti, al vettore frequenza e alle curve di fragilità dei 
materiali si ottiene la probabilità di guasto legata all’evento sismico. La somma dei due contributi 
permette di ottenere un dato generale, che tenga conto di tutte le possibili origini del rischio 
(meccaniche e naturali) in ottemperanza alla “Direttiva Seveso III”. A seconda della zona sismica 
prescelta è possibile notare come questi due contributi siano comparabili in zone mediamente 
sismiche, quello meccanico sovrasti il naturale in aree asismiche e viceversa in zone ad alto rischio 
sismico. Da notare come i dati utilizzati provengano da due forme di analisi diverse: quelli relativi al 
rischio meccanico sono derivati dall’analisi strutturale, frutto di anni di studi e di tecnologie sempre 
migliori; i dati relativi agli eventi sismici sono raccolti nelle serie storiche. Queste ultime riguardano 
gli ultimi cento anni di storia, da quando la sismologia ha cominciato a studiare i terremoti, e sono 
limitati e di carattere generale. Prendendo le mosse da questa precisazione il presente lavoro 
raggiunge risultati che, nonostante le semplificazioni adottate, sono promettenti e consigliano la 
prosecuzione dello studio. Le semplificazioni utilizzate riguardano il design delle apparecchiature 
(sprovviste della maggior parte dei sistemi di sicurezza solitamente utilizzati) e non considerano il 
fenomeno dello scuotimento cui vanno incontro i liquidi che subiscono un fenomeno sismico. 

Abstract 
The aim of this study is to develop a methodology that allows the risk assessment for storage vessels 
located in a seismic zone. Starting from the analysis of the fault tree and from the knowledge of 
probability distributions and using a calculation program specially developed, is possible to obtain 
the failure probability distributions concerning the equipment from a mechanical point of view. In 
this way, these data are compatible with the ones that is possible to obtain performing a seismic 
analysis: through the matrix of distribution of earthquakes, the frequency vector and the fragility 
curves of the equipment it is possible to obtain the probability of failure due to earthquakes. The sum 
of the two contributions allows to reach a global result, which takes into account all possible sources 
of risk (due to mechanical failure and natural events) in compliance with the "Seveso III Directive". 
Depending on the selected seismic zone it can be seen how these two contributions are comparable 
in medium seismic zones, the mechanical risk overhangs the natural in non-seismic areas and vice 
versa in high seismic zones. It is worth noticing that the data used are given by two different forms 
of analysis: those related to mechanical risks are derived from the structural analysis, results of years 
of study and technology improvement; The data for the seismic events are collected in historical 
series. These series give quantitative parameters only for the last one hundred years of history, since 
the seismology began to study earthquakes with proper instruments, and are limited and general. 
Starting on this specification, this work achieves promising results that have to be improved with 
further studies. In order to reach these results, some specifications were adopted: tank design didn’t 
take into account all safety measures that are used in a plant nowadays, also the shaking of the liquid 
wasn’t considered. 
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Introduction 
Nowadays, the risk assessment of chemical plants is considered a key parameter in terms of 
investment opportunity. In particular, safety perception in public opinion is an important factor that 
can determine the acceptance of a plant by surrounding inhabitants. 
The regulatory framework is discussed in Chapter 1 (concerning safety in chemical plants), in 
particular Seveso Directive and its modification are described. In 2012 the “Seveso III Directive” was 
promulgated and it considers, for the first time, domino effect due to natural events such as flooding 
and earthquakes. Seismic events are a characteristic of Italy: in fact, there are several seismic areas 
and almost all the peninsula is subject to this risk. 
This work tries to evaluate the risk that affects simple equipment located in seismic areas. An 
atmospheric and a pressurized tank are studied. These vessels were designed without all safety 
measures, so results obtained are simple to analyse. 
In order to evaluate the risk, it is important to choice the right method: it is important that the result 
of the analysis is a numerical value. There are a lot of possibilities, as in Chapter 2, some qualitative 
methods and some quantitative ones. In the first case, the result of the risk assessment will be a word 
or a risk level described with a phrase; in the second one, the method will give a number that can be 
used in calculation.  Fault tree analysis results to be the best method for this study: the presence of 
frequency parameter, derived by structural analysis, give well established results. Also the high and 
low limit of frequency will permit an analysis in terms of maximum and minimum calculation. 
In Chapter 2, the seismic aspect will be discussed: how seismic waves develop, which scale are 
adopted and how it is possible to evaluate the seismic risk for a chemical equipment. It is worth to be 
noticed that seismic parameters are obtained with an historical analysis. This is the critical point of 
the work: it is possible to obtain the historical series of several centuries but only for the last century, 
when the seismology became well established, there are also quantitative instrumental data. Their 
value is more general. 
Last in Chapter 2, design features of tanks will be discussed. With this analysis it is possible to 
comprehend which part of the equipment is subject to mechanical and seismic risk. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the combination between structural and historical data, trying to combine them. 
First of all, it is important to decide to use a deterministic or a probabilistic approach. In deterministic 
analysis results are expressed in pure numbers, giving directly the value of the risk; on the other hand, 
probabilistic analysis originates a distribution of probability in which it is possible to see most 
probable values and calculate a mean. This choice influences results. 
In Chapter 4, the case studies will be discussed. First of all, specific of the two vessel are presented, 
with maximum storage and measures. Then, the fault tree analysis is performed for mechanical risk. 
2  Introduction 
Starting from mechanical fault tree, the possibility of a seismic event is added and some modification 
to the previous fault tree will be done. 
In Chapter 4, the locations of case studies are described. In fact, location can determine the final value 
of the risk analysis. 
Chapter 5 shows the results of risk analysis for seismic event associated to equipment. 
The methodology used in this work allows to give a first try in risk analysis as the “Seveso III 
Directive” asks. Results are obtained using techniques well established in their field of application, 
so it is possible to assess that these results will give a good approximation to the real behaviour of the 
risk.
Chapter 1 
Regulatory Framework 
After II World War, global economy had a huge development. At the same time, also chemical 
industry knew this fast improvement without taking into account possible critical points: safety of 
workers and of the environment. Some laws were promulgated by the UE, in order to reduce the 
chances of a relevant accident. First one was “Seveso directive” (in 1982), improved by “Seveso II 
directive” (in 1996) and “Seveso III directive” (in 2012). The most important change was to not 
consider the industrial process itself but the substances involved in it and the possible compresence 
of natural hazards for chemical plant. 
1.1 Chemical industry evolution 
Chemical industry had known a huge and fast development in terms of type of productions and 
quantity of products in last 150 years. The growth of market of chemicals has brought out many safety 
problems: initially, when chemical industries were small, a relevant accident did not cause problems 
to the area surrounding the plant, but only within the plant. So, safety was considered a “private” 
question and every company would control it with its own regulation. But this system couldn’t stand 
long: big industries were affected by big accidents and the Countries began to approve laws in order 
to avoid them. 
In Italy, the first law that defends workers’ safety was promulgated in 1942 in the “Codice Civile”. It 
states that physical and moral safety in the work spaces has to be guaranteed by the employer. 
Unfortunately, this law began to work in a moment in which historical events didn’t allow to applicate 
it completely. Six years later, the 1st January of 1948, what was stated before became a constitutional 
law. Afterwards, a lot of improvements were applied to it. 
The Flixborough and Seveso accidents did emerge the following problems: one is the lack of 
knowledge and underestimation of risks arising from the presence of manufacturing plants and across 
the next growing attention to the protection and preservation of the environment and quality of life 
of individuals. Then, these incidents put the issue of industrial risk at the centre of the Italian and 
European public opinion debate. 
In the following paragraphed, the incidents of Flixborough and Seveso are briefly described. 
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1.1.1 Flixborough 
A Sunday in June 1974, in the Flixborough Works of Nypro Limited took place an accident, the first 
with a huge resonance in the chemical industry. The plant was designed to produce 70000 tons per 
year of caprolactam, a raw material for nylon production. The main chemical used in the reaction was 
cyclohexane, a dangerous flammable substance. The process took place at 155°C and 7.9 atm, 
conditions that immediately volatize the cyclohexane when depressurized to atmospheric conditions. 
For the production chain, six reactors in series were designed; each one, in normal operating 
conditions, contained 20 tons of reactant. 
Several months before the accident occurred, reactor 5 was found to be leaking: there was a crack in 
the structure. The decision was to remove and repair the reactor, while the plant continued the 
production with a direct connection between reactor 4 and 6. The connection was made using a 20” 
pipe instead of the 28”, used for connecting other reactors, because there was the only pipe diameter 
available in the plant. This choice caused the accident. The most accepted hypothesis was that the 
bypass pipe section broke down because of inadequate support and overflexing of the pipe section as 
a result of internal reactor pressure. 
As a consequence of the rupture of the bypass, a release estimate in 30 tons of cyclohexanone 
volatilized and form a large vapour cloud. Then there was an ignition and an UVCE (unconfined 
vapour cloud explosion) with 28 fatalities. 
Figure 1.1 shows the area involved in the accident after the intervention of the fire brigade. It all 
could be avoided if a serious risk analysis was carried out during plant modification. 
 
Figure 1.1: Flixborough area after UVCE. The accident caused the complete 
destruction of the plant. 
1.1.2 Seveso  
The plant involved in this accident was owned by Icmesa Chemical Company. The product was 
hexachlorophene, a bactericide, with the production of trichlorophenol as intermediate. Under normal 
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operation, a small amount of a dioxin (2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzoparadioxin also named TCDD) was 
produced as side-product. This dioxin is one of the most toxic agent produced in chemical processes. 
This substance is insoluble in water, so the decontamination can be very difficult. 
On 10th July 1976, the trichlorophenol reactor went out of control, with a higher temperature than the 
normal one. This caused an increasing production of TCDD and their release in the atmosphere as a 
cloud: to avoid the explosion of the reactor, safety valves opened. The area, where some little towns 
are located, was surrounded by this toxic product that settled to the ground with heavy rain; so it had 
to be evacuated and isolated, as shown in Figure 1.2. This intoxication caused a lot of damage for an 
area that was mainly agricultural: a layer of soil was removed where the contamination was higher. 
Also today, forty years after that accident, the effects on the health of people are not clear. 
 
Figure 1.2: a policeman in the anti-contamination suit puts the seals in the area. 
1.2 Seveso Directive 
These events induced the European Community to adopt a legislation directed to prevent industrial 
accidents. So, in 1982 was promulgated the so called “Seveso Directive” (82/501/ECC). In this first 
attempt of legislation there are some key points: 
 Obligation to inform inhabitants about risks linked to the industrial production; 
 Importance of the prevention of relevant accidents; 
 Need to teach and inform workers how to react in some situation and how to avoid them; 
 Direct link with institution that will control the industry in terms of safety. 
In Italy, “Seveso Directive” became effective only in 1988 with the D.P.R. 175/88. Some significant 
passages are reported below: 
 The employer has to draw up a safety report in terms of dangerous substances, plants and other 
relevant accidents with all measures adopted in order to avoid risk and minimize damages. This 
report has to be sent to the ministry of health and of environment. (Art.4) 
 The employer has to declare to the region and to the prefect that all risks were analysed and all 
corrective measures were taken. (Art.6) 
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 The population of the area have to be informed about production, process, substances and risks 
by the mayor. (Art.11) 
 The prefect has to draw up an external emergency plan and to secure that population knows it. 
(Art17) 
After Seveso directive, legislation seems to be quite prepared to all accidental events. 
If the European Community claimed to have a good legislation in terms of risk analysis, the rest of 
the world was still backward in this field: in fact, two huge accidents take places in 1984. Two cities 
were involved: Bhopal (India) and Mexico City (Mexico). 
In the following paragraphed, these incidents are briefly described. 
1.2.1 Bhopal Incident 
The first incident took place in the Union Carbide plant near Bhopal (in Madhya Pradesh state, central 
India). The plant produced pesticides for local farmers. The price of this product is prohibitive for 
Indian people and there were labour disputes so the production was interrupted. 
An intermediate for the reaction was methyl isocyanate (MIC), an extremely dangerous compound: 
it is reactive, volatile, toxic, flammable and it create respiratory disease in people exposed to it. The 
boiling point of MIC is 39°C and when it vaporizes, it settles to the ground. The main problem, in 
this case, is the exothermic reaction with water, that can generate vapours if doesn’t cooled. 
Somehow, the MIC tank become contaminated maybe with water, and the substance temperature rose 
over the boiling one. Vapours released travelled within the scrubber and the flare system that were 
unfortunately not operating, for reasons stated before. An estimation of 25 tons of toxic vapours were 
released. The cloud travelled to the near the city of Bhopal and killed 3000 people. Other deaths took 
places in the following days and months. In the end, at least 15000 people died and more and more 
were affected by serious diseases. In Figure 1.3 there is a picture of the plant after the accident in 
1984. 
 
Figure 1.3: Union Carbide plant after Bhopal disaster in 1984. 
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The exact cause of contamination of MIC in not known, but the real cause of the accident was the 
abandon state of the plant, stopped without an operating schedule. If there had been a precise plan, 
all safety measures would not have been turned off while a reactant was in the tank. 
1.2.3 Mexico City Incident 
The Mexico City accident took place in San Juanico, near the capital. During some transfer operation 
in a LPG storage site, a pipe leaked and a cloud of gas settled to the ground. After 10 minutes, there 
was the first ignition near the tanks that generated the first BLEVE (boiling liquid expanding vapour 
explosion). Other 11 explosions were registered that day and 11000 m3 of LPG were burned. There 
were 550 fatalities and the plant area was wasted. Figure 1.4 represents the accident area after 
explosions.  
 
Figure 1.4: San Juanico site after tanks explosion. A part of the LPG still burns. 
This event is useful for this work: an LPG tank will be one of the case studies. 
1.3 Seveso II Directive 
Due to these accidents, a revision of the first law take place and in 1996 was promulgated “Seveso II 
Directive” (96/82/CE). The most important change affects consideration of areas surrounding the 
plant: in the last two fatal accidents, plants were situated in a high density populate area. This arises 
a lot of problems in the definition of an emergency plan that were not taken in account in the first 
directive. 
The most important differences between the first directive and the second one are summarized below: 
 Whereas Seveso I takes in account risks linked to the industrial activity in the site, the second one 
considers dangerous substances and risk of relevant accidents related to them; 
 In the second directive is introduced the obligation for the employer to draw up a document where 
is reported his own policy about safety and prevention of accidents; 
 Domino effect become a key element in the evaluation of the risk associated to a plant; 
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 Policies about urbanization have to be discussed in terms of safety of population living nearby 
chemical plants; 
 Population has the right to read all documents about safety report; 
 All authorities have to be informed by the employer about relevant accidents occurred in the plant. 
This new directive introduces an important concept that will reach an important position in this work: 
domino effect. It is worth to define these terms now. Domino effect is “the situation in which 
something, usually something bad, happens, causing other similar events to happen” (Cambridge 
dictionary). In chemical terms, an accident, however a small one, can generate a lot of consequences 
until a relevant event occurs. 
“Seveso II Directive” was adopted in Italy with the D.Leg. 334/99, tracing the changes to the first 
directive. The key issue became communication between the industry, competent authorities and 
population. 
As in previous cases, another relevant accident, that occurred in Fukushima Daiichi, has highlighted 
of the issues not included in the earlier directives. In the following paragraphed, this incident is briefly 
described. 
1.3.1 Fukushima incident 
This disaster is not related with chemical industry but with a nuclear plant. The 11th March 2011 an 
earthquake with a magnitude of 9.0 in the Richter scale took place 70 kilometers away from Japan 
coast. The seismic movement also caused a tsunami with a 40m tall wave. There were a lot of 
consequences for industrial activities such as refinery set on fire, interruption of the electricity in a 
wide area and problem for transports. The main event, unfortunately, was the melt down of the third 
reactor of the Fukushima nuclear plant with a release of radioactive material. The tsunami enabled 
the cooling system for this core and the temperature arose significantly. The concrete melted and the 
radioactive material was free to spread out. The effects on health an environmental required a lot of 
countermeasures by authorities and continue until today. In Figure 1.5 an overview of the nuclear 
plant after the tsunami is represented.  
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Figure 1.5:Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant after the earthquake and the 
tsunami. It is possible to see the third reactor burning because of the core meltdown. 
The causes of this disaster can be found in the safety procedure of the plant: all possible mechanical 
risks were taken into account, otherwise, the seismic component was unexpected. There were studies 
that considered the possibility of a tsunami in the area but they were ignored. With an accurate study 
of all risk component, this disaster could have been avoided. 
1.4 Seveso III Directive 
In following years, lot of improvements were applied to the second directive and a new one was 
redacted, taking into account that also natural events could lead relevant accidents. In 2012, the 
“Seveso III Directive” (2012/18/EU) was promulgated. June 2015 was the deadline for the 
transposition of this law in Italy. There are three important news in this new directive: 
 All substances have to be classified with the European regulation 1272/2008, in terms of 
packaging and labelling; 
 Population has the right to see all documents about safety and risks linked to a chemical plant and 
these documents have to be written in non-technical terms, understandable and clear; 
 The accidental scenarios have to take in account all natural events, such as earthquakes or flood. 
The last point is the most important one: until now all studies about safety in plants take in account 
either chemical risks, either natural risks but not together.  
The aim of this study is to try to combine what we know about damages carried out from earthquakes 
with our knowledge about chemical risk. All this information will be applied in a simple situation: a 
standard cylindrical tank at atmospheric pressure with floating roof and a pressurized tank. In both 
there is a simple fluid such as water. Then, a statistical analysis will be carried out in order to analyse 
probability of earthquakes and frequency of chemical accidents. 
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Anyhow, first of all an analysis of what is the so-called “State of art” has to be done.
Chapter 2 
State of Art 
Risk analysis reaches a good degree of reliability either in the chemical field, either in the seismic 
one. There are some techniques that allow to calculate the global value of the risk in chemical plant 
such as the fault tree and the event tree. For seismic aspects, the analysis is based on the possibilities 
of an earthquake and the fragility of materials. These two branches have to be applied in a simple 
system, such as tanks. In this case is worth to know how floating roof tanks and pressurized one are 
build. 
2.1 Analysis of chemical risk  
In order to analyse chemical risks in a plant, some useful techniques are used. All them have to recall 
the key points of all directive described above. 
There are two groups of methods that could be used to assess the risk in a chemical plant: qualitative 
and quantitative. The first kind of methods include all procedure that to the question “What is the risk 
in this plant?” answer with a phrase or a word. Examples of these methods are the Dow-chemical 
exposure index or the What-if analysis. Quantitative methods are objective: they answer with a 
probability of fault or event, considering the plant equipment. It is unnecessary to say that these 
quantitative methods are both more accurate and more expensive than the first one. 
For a good understanding of risk analysis, it is worth to start with simplest ones that are presented as 
“indexes methods” in which the operative procedure is quick and simple: 
1. Plant is divided in section characterized by a key process; 
2. Main substance is identified; 
3. To each section is assigned a negative factor that rises risk value; 
4. Non compensated risk is calculated; 
5. Compensation factor analysis; 
6. Calculation of compensated risk indexes. 
To give an objective analysis, if it’s possible for a qualitative method, a checklist is used: all aspects 
of the plant are written in them, which are materials, which are procedures and which are equipment. 
The employer has to verify if safety parameters are satisfied in each phase of the plant life: project, 
construction, start, running and stop. 
For a more accurate study, the Dow-chemical exposure index is used. With a table, this method 
assigns a coefficient to all hazards of the plant. With some relation, sum and multiplication of factors, 
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a qualitative result is obtained. It is worth to be noticed that results are expressed in a qualitative way: 
every risk class has a range in numerical results linked to the nominal value of the risk (from light to 
heavy). 
These indexes methods are an excellent preliminary analysis because they are very quick and they 
have the support of a software: it is enough to know substances and equipment to assign coefficients 
and to calculate the risk. But this analysis is not complete: there are a lot of possibility for a failure 
and a lot of consequences that these methods don’t take into account. It is a better idea to choose 
another analysis strategy that will suggests also what to do to avoid accidents. 
2.1.1 “What if?” 
The “What if?” method is more similar to a guide to the correct use of the plant than a risk analysis. 
The core feature of this procedure is to verify what happens if somewhere in the plant there is a 
deviation from standard condition. 
It is worth to be noticed that this method is less accurate than the previous one and, for this reason, it 
is often coupled with other analysis in order to give also a numerical result. 
The common procedure for the “What if?” method is: 
1. Definition of boundaries of the study in terms of physical system (which part of the plant or of 
the surrounding area) and of consequences target (population, workers or production). 
2. Collection of information linked to the categories chosen above. 
3. Definition of the working team (size of this group depends on problem complexity, sometimes is 
sufficient only one person). 
4. Perform the analysis. 
5. Results communication. 
To find out how accurate this method is, just check the definition of boundaries in point 1. More 
complex is the plant and more are the interaction with the surrounding areas, bigger the team has to 
be. To coordinate the work of each component a leader is required. In Table 2.1 is reported the 
duration of each phases of the “What if?” method for a simple system and for a complex one. 
Table 2.1: duration of phases in "What if?" analysis 
Scope Preparation Performing analysis Information collection 
Simple/ Small System 4/8 hours 4/8 hours 1/2 days 
Complex/Large System 1/3 days 3/5 days 1/3 weeks 
 
When all the information are collected (plant scheme, mechanical scheme of equipment, check-list 
for operating procedures and for emergencies). 
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With all these information and with the knowledge of chemical mechanism in the plant, is possible 
to write down a relation. An example is reported in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1: example of a what if analysis concerning overfilling problems of a tank. 
2.1.2 Hazop 
When a further analysis in needed, the technique that should be used is the HAZOP. The name means 
“Hazard and operability study” and it is similar to the “What if?” with a methodical scheme as 
represented in Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2: Hazop operative scheme. 
 
The first step in the analysis is to divide the plant in nodes. A node is a unit where there are few 
processes and that is independent from other nodes. 
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Second step concerns the study of a single node with its processes and flows. When all the 
mechanisms are well studied, it is possible to go further. 
For each parameter involved in the node (such as temperature, flowrate, pressure and composition), 
some guide words have to be used: 
 No: when there is a negation of the design intent (e.g. a liquid doesn’t flow in a pipe). 
 Less: when the amount of a specific parameter is lower form the design value (e.g. a lower 
temperature in a boiler). 
 More: when the amount of a specific parameter is higher form the design value (e.g. a higher 
pressure in a reactor). 
 Part of: when the quality of a flow is decreasing (e.g. the composition of a product is less than the 
design value). 
 As well as: when the quality of a flow is increasing (e.g. a reactor is producing more than the 
design value). 
 Revers: when the logical scheme is reverted from the designed one (e.g. pressure in two tanks is 
inverted). 
 Other: when other operations are going on in the plant (e.g. during plant start). 
To go further, it is necessary to evaluate all possible consequences for each guide word in each node. 
Then, a possible solution to the problem arisen have to be formulated and to be written down in a 
safety report. 
It is worth to be noticed that this method requires a good organization of the working team, that is 
usually very large: there is a chairman, a safety engineer, who has to coordinate other people; a scribe, 
who takes note and will write the safety report; one representative of each discipline involved in 
design (process, mechanical, control and instrumentation, …), who will answer the issues raised in 
his field; eventually other specialist, for every particular issues. 
Moreover, an accurate documentation is needed: all papers about the plant (PFD, P&I and layout) 
and about substances have to be read and analysed. 
The result is a document where all possible deviations are taken into account. An example can be 
seen in Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3: example of an Hazop analysis, with reference to the plant scheme. 
2.1.3 FMECA 
One last qualitative method is FMECA that stands for: “Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality 
Analysis”. This technique is very similar to the “What if?” for the approach: is brainstorming-based 
and wants to evaluate all possible failures and effects of them to the plant. 
The key points of this method are: 
 Simple and systematic analysis, also with some support software. 
 Useful also in project phase because it can highlight the weak points of the plant. 
 Used as a support for fault tree and for reliability studies. 
 Influenced by the degree of experience of the safety engineer. 
 Takes in account only a single failure. 
This technique is mostly used in mechanical industry for this last point: chemical industry involves a 
lot of substances and processes that influence each other. A little failure in a little section of the plant 
can lead to a catastrophic accident due to the domino effect. 
An example of FMECA is represented in Figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4: example of a FMECA analysis. With causes of the failure and possible 
solutions. 
The FMECA also introduces the concept of frequency, a key parameter for the quantitative analysis. 
2.1.4 Fault Tree 
The qualitative analysis can not reach objective results. In order to obtain better results that can be 
compared each other, quantitative methods were created. The aim of these techniques is to quantify 
the value of the risk through a number: higher the number, higher the risk. A safety engineer has to 
know how to reduce this number under a parameter that is the acceptable value for the risk. 
It is time to introduce a new topic: failure frequencies. A frequency is a number between 0 and 1. It 
represents how many cases will occur in one year. For example, a failure frequency of 2.8·10-7 means 
that there will occur 2.8 failure in 10000000 years, a very low value. It is worth to be noticed that the 
value used for this analysis is a mean: the number representing the frequency is obtained by a graphic 
of the failure distribution, represented by a normal distribution curve (Figure 2.5), and so it is 
impossible to determine a unique value without making some approximations. This procedure 
simplifies the analysis of the risk and allows to reach a result quickly.  
 
Figure 2. 5: normal distribution curve. The shape is influenced by the mean value and 
the standard deviation. 
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Every equipment has frequencies for the rupture of each mechanical part, so it is possible to take in 
account all possibilities for a failure. But there is another problem: there are a lot of data for 
frequencies of single section, such the one reported in Table 2.2, but none for the entire equipment. 
How is it possible to calculate it? A probability study will answer the question. As stated before, the 
mean value of the frequency is used (written in the central column). Other value will be discussed 
further below. 
 
Table 2.2: example of failure frequencies for a floating roof tank. As can be seen, 
there are three possible values for this parameter. 
Type of release Event per 
33,909 tank 
years 
Frequency and 99% reliability 
intervals (10-3/tank year) 
Minimum Mean Maximum 
Tank structure leaks (corrosion) 19 0.3 0.56 1.0 
Tank structure leaks, including 
drainage 
33 0.6 1.0 1.5 
Tank structure leaks and leaks due to 
operational overfilling 
47 0.94 1.4 2.0 
Tank structure leaks. leaks due to 
operational overfilling and steam coil 
breakage 
50 1.0 1.5 2.1 
Release outside tank shell – all causes 96 2.1 2.8 3.7 
 
The probability analysis is called “Fault tree”. It is a very useful technique for risk analysis because 
it links all possible failures to a top event that is the scenario in which the equipment is broken, a 
release is occurred with a lot of consequences for the entire plant and the surrounding area. To reach 
this event, various little failures have to be linked with a hierarchical approach: there are many roots 
in this “Fault tree”, each one will divide its path up to an elementary failure with a specific frequency. 
Only considering all contributions, it is possible to reach a result for the probability of the event. 
Some operators are very useful to comprehend how to reach a unique result from these little accidents. 
Two of them are mostly used in risk assessment: “and” and “or”. To best explain their meaning, an 
example is used. It is based to Figure 2.6. 
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Figure 2.6: example of a Fault tree. All possible failures are linked together using 
“and” and “or” operators. 
Operator in A, B and D are “or”, so the logical path is true if one of the event below is true. In practise, 
node B will be true if 1 or 2 will verify, one of them is sufficient. Therefore, in terms of frequencies, 
values of 1 and 2 have to be summed. 
Instead, in C and E there is an “and” operator. Logically, it means that the event will verify only if 
both event will occur. The node E will be true only if 7 and 8 will verify. Frequency in E is the product 
of frequencies of 7 and 8. 
To resume and be clear, it is possible to write the Equation 2.1 below in order to determinate the 
probability for the event “subsystem A” to occur. The operator “or” in A leads to a simple sum of all 
contribution of B, C and D; another sum in presented in B; in C there is a product due to the “and” 
operator; in D there are a sum for the contribution of 6 and E, and a product of the frequencies in E. 
ܧݒ݁݊ݐ ݌ݎ݋ܾܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ = [1 + 2] + [3 ∗ 4 ∗ 5] + [6 + (7 ∗ 8)] (2.1) 
The “Fault tree” technique in well established in risk analysis because it is simple and it leads to 
reliable results, at the same time. 
2.1.5 Event Tree 
If “Fault tree” can be compared to a tree and its roots, the “Event tree” will be the upper half: it begins 
with the top event and then divides in branches. 
The mechanism is different from the previous one: starting from a unique event, safety engineer has 
to think what are the possible scenarios. In a chemical plant, there are 3 different possibilities when 
a substance enters the atmosphere: 
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1. Dispersion: the substance is dispersed in the air, moved by wind. If it is a toxic compound, there 
will be problems for people living in the surrounding area and it is necessary to evacuate the 
inhabitants. If the substance is not toxic, there are no problems. A good knowledge of atmospheric 
condition will be determinant to avoid serious consequences. 
2. Fire: if the substance is flammable, it is possible that it will burn. This can occur only with a 
trigger in the area. The fire can be a pool fire, for a liquid substance that quits the tank before to 
burn; a tank fire, when the compound burns in the tank; a jet fire, when the tank is pressurized; a 
flash fire, a fire that burns all the substance in a short fraction of time; a fireball, a ball of 
flammable vapours burn until all the substance is consumed. Which fire type will occur is 
determined by timing of the trigger and substance proprieties. Also in this case, a knowledge of 
atmospheric condition and of the flammability limits of the substance will help to avoid 
catastrophes. 
3. Explosion: this is the worst case for an accident. A vapour cloud is released in the atmosphere 
due to the top event. The vapour mixes with air and then the cloud is triggered. If the burning 
reaction creates an overpressure, this event will be called explosion. It is called deflagration an 
explosion where pressure wave and combustion wave are distinct and the overpressure amount is 
low (few bars); it is called detonation an explosion where the combustion and the pressure wave 
are coupled and they have a supersonic speed, also the overpressure is high and it can reach dozens 
of bars. 
As stated before, only the knowledge of the atmospheric condition, of the surrounding areas and of 
the substances allows the engineer to anticipate consequences and to take countermeasures. 
An example of event tree is reported in Figure 2.7. 
 
Figure 2.7: example of an Event tree. In each node it is important to identify the 
trigger that differentiates two branches. 
These two techniques, “Fault tree” and “Event tree”, are used together to examine how an accident 
could occur, from a little fault to the top event and to the accidental scenario. An example of this 
coupling is represented in Figure 2.8, where there is a unique tree diagram with both fault and event 
part. 
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Figure 2.8: fault tree and Event tree linked together. 
2.2 Analysis of risk relate to earthquakes 
The next step in the risk analysis concerns about earthquakes: the chemical risk satisfied the first and 
the second “Seveso directive”, but it is not enough for the third one. In order to consider all aspects 
about the risk the natural component is not negligible anymore. The greatest risk factor in terms of 
natural event is earthquake, for this reason, seismic movements are studied in the work. 
State of Art  21 
 
 
 
2.2.1 Earthquakes 
An earthquake is “a sudden violent shaking of the ground, typically causing great destruction, as a 
result of movements within the earth's crust or volcanic action.”1 The earth’s crust is not a single 
block but is formed by many plaques, floating on the asthenosphere, the external part of the mantle. 
Convective movements in the asthenosphere causes movements on the plaques. These movements 
are completely chaotic and there is not a dominant direction in them. Some of the plaques are free to 
move and permit these displacements, otherwise some problems could arise. In fact, when two 
plaques are in contact, every move of the mantle create an accumulation of potential energy that can 
last for years. This energy reaches a peak and then is released in an earthquake. 
 
When an earthquake occurs there are four types of seismic waves, two of them are defined as body 
waves because they develop themselves in the deep part of the crust, the other two are called 
superficial for the movement above the crust: 
 
 Primary waves (P-type) are compressive waves with a longitudinal that origins in the mantle and 
reach the surface.  They are pressure waves and their name is due to the speed that characterize 
them, in fact they are the firs waves that reach seismographs. They propagate through every 
material. 
 Secondary waves (S-wave) are shear waves that are transverse in nature. They displace the ground 
perpendicular to the direction of propagation. They can only travel through solids because fluids 
don’t support shear stress. 
 Rayleigh waves (ground roll) travel on the surface with a movement similar to water waves. 
 Love waves (SH waves) are horizontally polarized shear waves. 
The graphic representation of this four types of waves is reported in Figure 2.9.  
                                                 
1 Definition from the Oxford Dictionary, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/earthquake 
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Figure 2.9: types of seismic waves and their mechanism of propagation. P and S 
waves are body waves and move from the origin of the earthquake to the surface. 
Rayleigh and Love waves propagate in the surface in a circle area from the origin of 
the earthquake. 
In order to measure the power of an earthquake, some scale have been created. Three of them are well 
established today: 
 Mercalli scale: it measures damages suffered by structures, mainly civil building, affected by an 
earthquake. This scale heavily depends from constructive criteria of an area, so the same 
earthquake can create huge damages in an ancient house and none in a modern skyscraper. 
 Richter scale: was developed to avoid all possible dependence in the calculation of the power of 
an earthquake. It represents simply the logarithm of the amplitude of waves registered by 
seismographs with some adjustments to compensate the variation of distance between the center 
of the earthquake and every single seismograph. 
 PGA: is the index of the maximum ground acceleration that occurred in a location during the 
earthquake. It measures not the power of the earthquake but the ground shaking. This parameter 
is very useful for risk analysis because every material has a maximum solicitation that it can 
adsorb. When this level is passed, the fracture is possible. The PGA is measured in g (gravity 
acceleration) fraction or, rarely, in m/s2. 
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The PGA scale is very important for further analysis; it is necessary to explain how a change in PGA 
affects the power of the earthquake perceived. In Table 2.3, PGA scale is reported. 
Table 2.3: PGA scale for earthquakes. 
Instrumental 
Intensity 
Acceleration 
(g) 
Velocity 
(cm/s) 
Perceived Shaking 
I < 0.0017 < 0.1 Not felt 
II-III 0.0017 - 0.014 0.1 - 1.1 Weak 
IV 0.014 - 0.039 1.1 - 3.4 Light 
V 0.039 - 0.092 3.4 - 8.1 Moderate 
VI 0.092 - 0.18 8.1 - 16 Strong 
VII 0.18 - 0.34 16 - 31 Very strong 
VIII 0.34 - 0.65 31 - 60 Severe 
IX 0.65 - 1.24 60 - 116 Violent 
X+ > 1.24 > 116 Extreme 
2.2.2 Seismic areas in Italy 
In seismic terms, Italy has two great areas. It is visible in Figure 2.10 that the high risk areas are 
Apennines, Sicily and Friuli.  
 
Figure 2.10: seismic map of Italy. The legend expresses all the PGAs in terms of g. 
Two great seismic areas are along Apennines and in Friuli, due to orogeny. 
This danger is due to the orogeny mechanism: in these two area there are relatively young mountains, 
created by the clash between the Eurosiatic plate and the African one. For this reason, in order to 
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study effects of an earthquake on an industrial production, is important to choose wisely the location. 
In this work, the two examples are located in Osoppo (UD) in the middle of the highest seismic zone 
in Friuli, in Falconara Marittima (AN) where the recent earthquakes caused the shaking of some 
columns, in Priolo Gargallo (SR) near Mount Etna. These choices have a precise aim: the seismic 
aspect is even more important if the risk of a relevant earthquake is high; so a study of the risk with 
these extreme conditions will represent a very good approximation and a precise test for the 
methodology. With these three locations, all possible ranges of seismic risk are analysed and so the 
results will lead to a complete representation of the seismic phenomena. If results are good, the 
method used in this case will fit also in other possible location, ensuring that results are reliable. 
2.2.3 Seismic risk for chemical plants 
Seismic risk analysis in chemical and industrial plants is based on a probabilistic approach. There are 
two main phases that are useful to comprehend the mechanism of this analysis: 
1. In the first phase, the seismic hazard analysis is carried out: it is important to know how many 
earthquakes are expected in an area and how much is the power released by them. On this base, 
using databanks it is possible to create a graphic that represents how the seismic risk will change 
in terms of PGA and probability of occurrence. For example, Figure 2.11 represents the seismic 
hazard curve for three places located in Campania region, southern Italy. Is worth to be noticed 
that there are high probability of low power earthquakes and vice versa, as can be expected. 
Another important parameter in order to design properly these curves is the time interval. It is an 
important discriminant for the analysis: probability is a cumulative concept, so create a proper 
time interval helps to obtain results that are reliable for a further analysis of data. In order to 
realize these curves, it is necessary to take in account the history of earthquakes in a region. 
 
Figure 2.11: seismic curves for three locations in southern Italy with a time interval 
of 1 year. As expected, the probability of an earthquake with low power is very high. 
Otherwise, a destructive event will have almost no probability to occur in the time 
interval considered. 
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2. In the second phase, a failure model for all equipment is carried out: on the base of the previous 
analysis is possible to study how materials will react when there are earthquakes of different 
intensities. This phase is based on the fragility curves of materials used in the plant. To determine 
the curve is used the Equation (2.2). In it the probability of a failure (Pf) is the integral of the 
probability of the seismic demand D to exceed the seismic capacity C for all PGA possible values. 
The seismic demand is what is required by the earthquake in terms of shakes absorption; the 
seismic capacity what the equipment can absorb. From this formula is possible to draw the 
fragility curve of a material. An example of these curves is reported in Figure 2.12. 
௙ܲ =  ׬ ݀(Pr [ܦ > ܥ])
ஶ
଴   (2.2) 
 
 
Figure 2.12: example of fragility curves. The amount of damage to the equipment 
depends on the PGA. At medium PGA value, probability of an extensive damage is 
lower than that for a slight damage, as can be expected. 
Another important aspect is the progression of damage: the same earthquake, with the same PGA in 
a site, can create different damages. The probability of a little damage is higher than the probability 
of a heavy one because when the seismic demand exceeds the seismic capacity, the probability of a 
little excess is higher than the one of a huge excess. 
2.3 Tank design features 
Substance stocking is an important stage of all industrial operation: decide how to storage compounds 
used or produced by the plant can change the approach to the entire production. 
There are many types of tanks, schematized in Figure 2.13 below. 
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Figure 2.13: types of tanks sorted by main characteristics and uses. 
Some of them are very simple to understand: 
 Open top tanks: they have no roof. It is important to remember that only non-dangerous 
substances are allowed to be stored in them, such as cooling water. 
 Fixed roof tanks: the roof can not move so they are susceptible to any pressure change in them. 
Also normal operation as loading and discharging can create a huge pressure drop with possible 
damages to the shell or the roof. It is worth to be noticed that there are many systems to avoid 
damages: a simple pipe that links the content of the tank to the external pressure could be a good 
solution, for atmospheric storage, or a valve calibrated with the right pressure, for high and low 
pressure storage. If the substance is dangerous, an appropriate purification process is needed 
before gas releasing. 
For the analysis, two types of tanks have to be analysed properly: floating roof tanks and spherical 
pressurized tanks. 
2.3.1 Atmospheric pressure tank with floating roof 
One of the commonly used techniques for industrial storage of liquids is the floating roof thank. The 
scheme of this equipment is reported in Figure 2.14. 
State of Art  27 
 
 
Figure 2.14: example of floating roof tank with main equipment. 
This tank has two roofs and it is called internal floating roof: the second roof, placed on the top of the 
shell has the function to prevent atmospheric events to reach the floating roof. In fact, when an 
external floating roof tank is used, it is possible that the rain accumulates over the roof. This could 
lead to an imbalance of the structure and to the loss of roof sealing with substance spill. Also the 
snow could be a problem: the weight of a layer of snow could affect the pressure in the tank and all 
process in the plant with that. There are two solutions for this problem, the first one is to build an 
internal floating rood tank, the second involves the construction of a drainage system for rain water. 
In this case study, an internal floating roof tank for benzene is considered. There are some particular 
features necessary to build this kind of storage utility: 
 There are some vacuum breakers in order to allow the first filling of the tank and the air outlet. 
They are also useful in the emptying phase. 
 For normal operation there are valves to keep constant the pressure in the tank. 
 The seal is the most important part of the roof; it has to avoid any substance losses. 
 The roof could rotate during operations, so it is important to use methods to avoid this movement. 
In Figure 2.14 there are some cables fixed to the external roof. 
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Other features are less important, such as manhole for inspections or wells for sampling the substance 
in the tank. 
In order to improve the safety, a secondary containment should be provided. 
For some precise construction specification, the appendix H of the “API 650” standard could be used. 
2.3.2 Pressurized tank 
Pressurized tanks have many uses. A small vessel could be used as gas bottle in houses and a big one 
as storage for an industrial production. There are a many possible shapes for a pressurized tank, in 
dependence from pressure of storage and substance to store. For large amount of compounds to store 
there are in particular two types of tanks: 
 Bullet, a cylinder with a horizontal axis and two hemispherical ends in order to reach higher 
pressure. It is mostly used in private facilities as houses and gas stations because doesn’t have 
many safety problems. Otherwise, sometimes also large storage plants are composed of this tanks. 
 Spherical, the shape of the sphere allows the tank to reach the highest pressure possible in 
dependence to the shell material. They are the most used in the world in terms of storage of 
pressurized gases. 
In Figure 2.15 below, an example of these types of tanks is reported.  
       
(a)       (b) 
Figure 2.15: examples of commonly used pressurized tanks. In (a) it is possible to see 
the bullet shape, used in medium pressure storage of LPG (in this case). In (b), a 
spherical tank in reported, placed in the center of an industrial plant. This type of  
tanks are used fot high pressure installations and large storage capacities. 
The study will last longer on the second one: is the facility used in large storage areas, as was the 
Juanico before the disaster. As stated before, the spherical shape allows to reach very high pressure. 
There is a correlation to determine how much of a substance a spherical tank can contain, known its 
material, its pressure and its volume. The Equation (2.3) is reported below. 
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In terms of design, the spherical tank is very simple: it is composed by a shell with two outgoing 
pipes, linked to two valves. These valves are used for incoming and outcoming fluxes of the 
substance. For a simple storage one valve will last, but often this tanks are used in continuum in a 
plant, so an entrance and an exit are required. 
The next step in the analysis is to evaluate how to express the risk in term of probability. 

Chapter 3 
Statistic Approach 
The next step in risk calculation concerns on identification of the proper approach to use. There are 
generally two possibilities: deterministic approach, usually used in mechanical risk calculation, and 
probabilistic approach, used in seismic risk assessments. The second one is more suitable for this 
analysis. Another problem is the conversion of mechanical data to probabilistic ones, so it is possible 
to write a code to resume both risk analysis in a unique one. 
3.1 Deterministic or probabilistic approach? 
In order to determine the chemical risk in an industrial plant located in a seismic area it is important 
to choose wisely the method to adopt: this method have to take into account all possible failure due 
either to breakage due to wear either to seismic shear rupture. There are two possibilities: the first 
one concerns a deterministic point of view, the second one a probabilistic analysis. Each one of these 
methods has its peculiar characteristics and for this reason they are used for different applications: in 
general, the deterministic approach is used in risk analysis for chemical plant, otherwise the 
probabilistic one is more suitable for seismic analysis. A risk assessment for a plant liable for both 
these types of accidents have to consider these two aspects at the same time. Which of them have the 
characteristics more suitable for this case study? 
Before a decision on the path to choose, it is worth knowing main characteristics of both of them. 
3.1.1 Deterministic approach 
A deterministic mathematical model is meant to yield a single solution describing the outcome of 
some "experiment" with given inputs appropriate for the simulation. In this case all events are 
determined by a simple cause-effect chain; so if something happens, a consequence will occur with 
certainty. Starting from this assumption, it is possible to build a chain with scheduled responses to 
scheduled inputs, knowing in advance all possible events in a plant. Furthermore, it is possible to 
assume the causes once an effect is analysed, in order to going back gradually to the first event of the 
chain. Identified this event, that could also be only a small crack in a pipe, it is possible to project a 
plant where this could not happen. Done this, it is possible to state that the main event will not occur. 
Now, it is possible to describe a methodology within chemical risk analysis, based on a deterministic 
approach. The main feature of this methodology is to analyse the cascade of events. An example of 
methods in this context is the fault tree. 
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As stated in section 2.1.4, the fault tree analysis is based on the concept of frequencies. Frequencies 
are an example of deterministic assumption: they express a number with certainty. For that sureness, 
engineers will know that if the frequency indicated is 4·10-2 that equipment will suffer of four fault 
in one hundred years. Despite this evaluation seems good, that number of faults in little time interval 
will lead to accidents. 
In order to use a deterministic approach in the analysis of an equipment’s safety, it is worth noticing 
that rupture frequencies are obtained with the mean of all failure registered for that piece. Therefore, 
as stated before the frequencies have a distribution and the only value used is the mean. 
In Table 3.1, it is possible to see how frequency used in chemical risk analysis can be expressed by a 
single value. Every event concerning the examined vessel will occur at least 3 times in 10000 years. 
No additional information are written in that table. In this case there aren’t clues of the distribution 
shape of failure. 
 
 
Table 3.1: example of failure frequencies for a tank, sorted by possible scenarios and 
vessel size. 
 
 
 
Risk engineers use these data because with them it is possible to resume all risks in a unique number 
and so evaluate all possible improvements in order to reduce it. 
Table 3.2 shows the collection data of failure frequency that it is useful to further analysis such as the 
possibility to convert them in a probabilistic behaviour.  
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Table 3.2: example of failure frequency for a tank. It is worth noticing that the 
average value is used in fault tree analysis. The other two data concern the 
probabilistic distribution: 99% of failures happen between these values. 
Cause Leakage (L) or 
explosion (E) 
Probability of occurrence (1/year) 
Minimum Average Maximum 
Manufacturing error L, E 4.8 10-9 4.3 10-8 1.6 10-7 
Material error L, E 5.3 10-8 1.4 10-7 3.1 10-7 
Mechanical stress L, E 2.2 10-8 8.6 10-8 2.2 10-7 
Corrosion L, E 2.2 10-8 8.6 10-8 2.2 10-7 
Overfilling L, E 1.5 10-9 2.9 10-8 1.6 10-7 
Wrong installation L, E 7.1 10-11 1.4 10-8 1.1 10-7 
Disconnection of a non-empty cylinder L 9.6 10-9 5.7 10-8 1.8 10-7 
Connection with incompatible material L 2.2 10-8 8.6 10-8 2.2 10-7 
Fall L 2.2 10-8 8.6 10-8 2.2 10-7 
Other L, E 2.5 10-7 4.3 10-7 6.7 10-7 
Total L, E 7.4 10-7 1.1 10-6 1.4 10-7 
Tanks to this table it is possible to analyse the main problem of the deterministic approach: whereas 
the mean states that there is only one manufacturing error every 25.255 million years, the third value 
states that that there is a possibility that an error occurs in 6.250 million years, an order of magnitude 
differences. In this case frequencies are really little and the difference is high but negligible. What 
will happen if frequencies are higher and this difference between the mean value and the last one is 
still one order magnitude? A 100 years’ recurrence could become a 10 years one in one of the 
boundary. This situation is not sustainable in chemical and safety engineering. 
For this reason, the probabilistic approach is used. 
3.1.2 Probabilistic approach 
The other possibility in risk assessment is the probabilistic approach. Unlike the previous one, the 
outcome of the analysis in not a number in this case, but only probability that the event will occur. 
The probabilistic approach simulates those future top events which, based on scientific evidence, are 
likely to occur. 
In the context of chemical risk, probability refers to the frequency of occurrence or the return 
period of losses associated with hazardous events. The return period is a key concept in order to 
comprehend how probability is calculated.  An example of return period calculation is reported below. 
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Figure 3.1: possible losses in a plant in 1000 years. The relevant accident limit is 
placed where there is a loss of 60 in the order of magnitude. Over the graph are 
reported time-intervals between an accident and the subsequent. With these value, it 
is possible to evaluate the probability of a failure. The graph is only an example of 
possible scenarios in a plant. 
The Figure 3.1Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata. shows a record of top events: an 
atmospheric release. In one thousand years it is possible to select all these events with a magnitude 
higher than 60, that is assumed as the limits for relevant accidents. Measuring time period between 
an event and the subsequent one it is possible to have an idea of the trend of the system: time period 
ranges from sixty to two hundred years. The average of the period between losses is 100 years, so 
this time interval is called return period. In simple terms, one loss will occur almost every one hundred 
years. The annual probability of exceeding a loss characterized by a 100-years return period is 0.01 
or 1%. 
The probabilistic approach is based on the distribution of all possibilities for an event to happen. Also 
in the example, it is possible to see how time-intervals are widely different from each other. If there 
were an infinite number of trials, the result would be similar to a normal distribution. 
It is possible to assess that a probabilistic approach can reach a better representation of the problem 
considered because of its capability of comprehend all possible solution and not only the central one, 
as the deterministic approach do. 
To resume, a probabilistic approach is used to determine the likelihood of a number of different 
events. Otherwise, a deterministic approach fits perfectly to test an evacuation plan or mitigation 
strategy against a selected event. However, even if the interest is knowing a specific risk scenario for 
a specific event, it is possible to obtain it from a probabilistic assessment. In fact, probabilistic 
approaches allow to identify and model scenarios whilst also accounting for their return period. 
Measuring the likelihood of events means that decision-makers are more informed and better able to 
select appropriate strategies for different scenarios, as risk reduction in the case of relevant risks and 
risk transfer in the case of more high-impact, but less likely, events. 
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Assessing risk probabilistically is a challenge, particularly because of the number of factors to account 
for and because risk is not static and is influenced by a number of other drivers. But probabilistic risk 
assessments are becoming the standard for risk assessment because they are a comprehensive 
approach, taking into account all possible variations. These assessments provide with a means of 
quantifying the impact and likelihood of events, while also accounting for the associated uncertainty. 
For these reasons, a risk assessment that comprehend both mechanical and seismic risk has to be 
written using the probabilistic approach. Whereas for a simple chemical risk assessment based only 
on mechanical failure the deterministic model fits well; in a seismic analysis, that is based on the 
probability of the PGA to exceed the seismic capacity of a tank, only a probabilistic model can 
generate a good report. 
It is worth to be noticed that final results of a probabilistic analysis are resumed in distribution graphs. 
It is important to know how to read these graphics in order to understand them in the right way. A 
resuming table that reports the mean values for all risks will be very useful for a quick idea of results. 
3.2 Data conversion 
The chosen method is the probabilistic one but, as stated in the previous paragraph, failure frequencies 
are presented as numbers and not with their probabilistic distribution. 
In order to use failure frequencies in the system, it is important to convert these value properly. In 
statistical terms the failure rate of mechanical components is described with a lognormal distribution. 
The formula of this distribution is reported in Equation 3.1. 
ݔ = ݁ఓାఙ௓ (3.1) 
“Random variable X has the lognormal distribution with parameters μ∈R and σ∈(0,∞) if ln(X) has 
the normal distribution with mean μ and standard deviation σ. The parameter σ is the shape 
parameter of X while eμ is the scale parameter of X.”2 Z represents a constant. 
In Figure 3.2 is reported an example of lognormal distribution. 
It is worth to be noticed that determining the shape of the distribution is a key parameter in the data 
conversion. To do that, some equations are needed: 
 
1. The first thing to do is to choose data from a databank. Data has to have the form of Table 3.2Table 
3., so it is possible to evaluate all parameters. The upper boundary (UB) and the lower one (LB), 
expressed in event over year, are fundamental to calculate the error ef with the (3.2). 
                                                 
2 Definition of “Lognormal distribution” by math department of the University of Alabama, 
http://www.math.uah.edu/stat/special/LogNormal.html, visited on 20.9.2016. 
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௙݁ = ඨ
ܷܤ
ܮܤ
 (3.2) 
 
Figure 3.2: example of lognormal distribution. As can be seen in the image, the 
standard deviation (σ) affects the shape of the distribution: lower the σ, higher the 
symmetry. The mean (μ) affects the position. 
 
Now, the calculation of the standard deviation is simple, using the (3.3). 
ߪ =
ln ௙݁
1.645
 (3.3) 
2. For the calculation of µ, the mean, it is necessary to introduce another parameter, v, as in the (3.4). 
In order to do that, the medium value for the frequency (m) is needed. This value is reported on 
the central column in Table 3.. 
ݒ = ݉ଶ ∗ (݁ఙమ െ 1) (3.4) 
3. Last passage concerns on µ calculation. Tanks to the definition of v, it is a simple operation that 
can be seen in (3.5). 
ߤ =
ln ݉ଶ
√ݒ + ݉ଶ
  (3.5) 
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With this procedure, used for the vector of all frequencies, it is possible to generate the lognormal 
distribution for mechanical faults. These probabilities need now to be combined with the seismic ones 
in order to calculate the total value of the risk. 
3.3 Numerics 
To simulate all possible PGAs in a seismic zone and to calculate as precisely as possible the value of 
the risk, a Matlab code was written. 
This program is formed by three parts. The first and second require the calculation of a different 
aspect of the risk, the third one resume all risks using the fault tree analysis. 
3.3.1 Seismic failure 
The first part of the code concerns about the calculation of seismic risk. In order to resume how the 
calculation is performed, a part of the program is reported below. 
R=xlsread('DistribuzioniOsoppo.xlsx', 'distanza', 'A1:A20'); 
M=xlsread('DistribuzioniOsoppo.xlsx', 'Magnitudo', 'A1:G1'); 
MP=xlsread('DistribuzioniOsoppo.xlsx', 'matrice', 'A1:G20'); 
F=xlsread('DistribuzioniOsoppo.xlsx', 'Frequenza', 'A1:G1'); 
  
r=length(R); 
m=length(M); 
logPGA=[]; 
for i=1:r 
    for j=1:m 
        logPGA(i,j)=-3.37+(1.93-0.203*M(j)).*M(j)+(-
3.02+0.00744*M(j)^3)*log10(sqrt(R(i)^2+7.3^2)); 
    end 
end 
  
sigma=0.358;  
mu2=0.38;  
sigma2=0.8;  
mu3=1.18;  
sigma3=0.61;   
PeqRS1=[]; 
PeqRS2=[]; 
PeqRS3=[]; 
PeqRS1=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS2=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS3=zeros(rand,1); 
  
for i=1:rand 
%     PGA1=10.^(logPGA+sigma); 
    PGA1=random ('norm',logPGA,sigma); 
    PGA=(10.^PGA1).*9.81; 
    RS3eq= cdf('logn',PGA,mu3,sigma3); 
    RS2eq=cdf('logn',PGA,mu2,sigma2); 
    Prs1=(1-RS2eq).*(MP./100); 
    Prs2=(RS2eq-RS3eq).*(MP./100); 
    Prs3=RS3eq.*(MP./100); 
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    PfRS11=sum(Prs1).*F; 
    PfRS1=sum(PfRS11(:)); 
    PfRS22=sum(Prs2).*F; 
    PfRS2=sum(PfRS22(:)); 
    PfRS33=sum(Prs3).*F; 
    PfRS3=sum(PfRS33(:)); 
    PeqRS1(i)=[PfRS1 ]; 
    PeqRS2(i)=[PfRS2 ]; 
    PeqRS3(i)=[PfRS3 ]; 
    i=i+1; 
end 
  
PeqRS =[PeqRS1 PeqRS2 PeqRS3]. 
The first part uses data by the national institute of geology and volcanology (INGV), were it is 
possible to find the databank concerning the seismic risk of every area of Italy. These value were 
reported in an excel document divided in distances, magnitudes (both of them using the mean value 
of the interval considerate), frequencies and the matrix of possible probabilities. 
Using a random value of distance and magnitude, it is possible to simulate an earthquake with a 
defined PGA, calculated and expressed in this case in logarithmic scale. The next step concerns the 
calculation of the lognormal distribution of PGAs, before risk calculation. 
It is important to know that there are three possibilities for a seismic impact in a plant, divided by the 
dimension of the leakage. To obtain a precise representation, all possibilities have to be examined. 
Next step defines three vectors, one for each failure severity. Then, calculating the cumulative 
distribution function using lognormal and parameters, it is possible to achieve a result expressed by 
a matrix of seismic risk. 
3.3.2 Mechanical failure 
In the mechanical part, the procedure replicates the procedure of section 3.2. As stated before, some 
data about failure frequencies are needed: the medium value, upper and lower limits. After the 
calculation of the error and other variables as described before, the two cycles “for” allows to 
calculate the distribution of fault probabilities with the lognormal trend. 
m= [0.0016 0.0011 0.0028];  
LB=[0.0011 0.0007 0.0021];  
UB=[0.0023 0.0016 0.0037];  
 
ef=sqrt(UB./LB); 
 
sig=log(ef)/1.645; 
v=(m.^2).*(exp(sig.^2)-1); 
sigma=sig; 
mu = log((m.^2)./sqrt(v+m.^2)); 
  
T=50; 
X=[]; 
for i=1:rand 
    for j=1:length(m) 
        X(i,j)=random ('logn',mu(j),sigma(j)); 
          if (X(j)<=UB(j) && X(j)>=LB(j)) 
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            X(i,j)=X(i,j); 
          else 
              if (X(j)<UB(j)) 
                  X(i,j)=UB(j); 
              end 
              if (X(j)>LB(j)) 
                  X(i,j)=LB(j); 
              end 
          end 
%           DF(i,j) = pdf('logn',X(i),mu(j),sigma(j)); 
          P1(i,j) = X(i,j); 
          RS1(i,j) = P1(i,j).*0.84; 
          RS2(i,j) = P1(i,j).*0.08; 
          RS3(i,j) = P1(i,j).*0.08; 
    end 
end 
PmRS1=sum(RS1,2)-(RS1(:,1).*RS1(:,2))-(RS1(:,2).*RS1(:,3))-
(RS1(:,3).*RS1(:,1)); 
PmRS2=sum(RS2,2)-(RS2(:,1).*RS2(:,2))-(RS2(:,2).*RS2(:,3))-
(RS2(:,3).*RS2(:,1)); 
PmRS3=sum(RS3,2)-(RS3(:,1).*RS3(:,2))-(RS3(:,2).*RS3(:,3))-
(RS3(:,3).*RS3(:,1)); 
  
PmRS =[PmRS1 PmRS2 PmRS3]. 
The last passages highlight how the risk for the three pieces of equipment is calculated and summed 
in a unique vector. 
The calculation of single contribution for mechanical and seismic risk is done. 
3.3.3 Combination of risks 
To sum up the two contribution a modification of the fault tree technique is used: the two branches 
represent the calculation of mechanical and seismic risk that will be summed in an unique distribution 
as below. 
PRS1=PeqRS1+PmRS1-(PeqRS1.*PmRS1); 
PRS2=PeqRS2+PmRS2-(PeqRS2.*PmRS2); 
PRS3=PeqRS3+PmRS3-(PeqRS3.*PmRS3); 
P=[PRS1 PRS2 PRS3]. 
The three contribution are computed in separate equations and then resumed in a vector. During the 
summation of probabilities due to the operator “or” of the fault tree, a correction factor is used: in 
order to avoid possible double counting of probabilities, to the sum is subtracted the product of the 
two frequencies. 
It is wort to be noticed that some the one presented in this chapter is a simplified version of the total 
code: the complete one is attached in the Appendix. Furthermore, all quantities present in this code 
are used as an example of calculation: in case studies of the chapter 4, the seismic location parameters 
and the mechanical failure frequencies will change. Also, the conformation of the fault tree will 
change due to the influence of seismic value also in the mechanical part. 
Figures presenting results are also described in the complete code at the end of this discussion. 

Chapter 4 
Case Studies 
In order to perform a good simulation, it is important to define proper case studies: all data required 
by the program had to be chosen wisely considering all possible condition for failure. The two fault 
trees can be build. As case studies, an atmospheric tank is located in Osoppo (UD) and a pressure 
vessel in Priolo (SR), two areas with high seismic risk with different characteristics in our country. 
As comparison terms, also the risk in Falconara Marittima (AN) will be calculated for both tanks. 
The presence of seismic risk influences the two fault trees, so they need some correction due to 
earthquake fragility. 
4.1 Atmospheric floating roof tank 
The first case study concerns a floating roof tank containing benzene at atmospheric pressure. As in 
2.3.1, technical knowledge in tank design is well established, with global standard. In this contest, it 
is simple to design a storage vessel based on specification in the Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: technical specification for the atmospheric tank of the case study. 
Height 11.5 m 
Diameter 7.6 m 
Maximum storage 500 m3 
These data have a relevant importance for the study of possible consequences of a relevant accident 
as an atmospheric release: knowing the amount of stored substance allows to simulate possible 
accidental scenarios; knowing the form factors involved, instead, the spill velocity of the liquid. 
In order to analyse all possible fault of the floating roof tank, Figure 4.1 represents a scheme of this 
equipment. 
 
Figure 4.1: simplified scheme of the vessel. With the floating roof tank, there are also 
the two pipes and valves for liquid income and outcome. 
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Starting from this scheme, it is possible to define all the risk associated with the equipment. The first 
part of the risk analysis will concern those risks that are linked with mechanical components. 
4.1.1 Stored substance and chemical risk 
In this case study, the substance stored in the floating roof tank is benzene. There are a large number 
of industrial plant producing this chemical, one of the most used in the word. 
In safety terms, benzene is a dangerous substance. It is associated with seven hazard sentences by the 
GHS (the international system for chemical classification ad labelling): 
 H225, highly inflammable liquid and vapour. 
 H304, may be fatal if swallowed and enters airways. 
 H315, causes skin irritation. 
 H319, causes serious eye irritation. 
 H340, may cause genetic defects. 
 H350, may cause cancer. 
 H372, causes damage to organ (blood) through prolonged or repeated exposure. 
Furthermore, benzene is a volatile substance so, in case of vessel rupture, there are three possibilities 
for an accidental scenario: if the benzene doesn’t ignite, a toxic dispersion will surround the incidental 
area; if it ignites immediately or from the pool formed on the ground, pool fire or jet fire will develop 
near the vessel; if vapour doesn’t ignite and the benzene vaporizes forming a cloud, a trigger will 
cause a flash fire or an explosion (UVCE). 
In the tank considered in this simulation, some possible faults are identified. Each one of these faults 
can cause the top event (a release). For a general view, in the Table 4.2 are reported every single fault 
and its frequency. 
Table 4.2: failure frequencies of components involved in the study. Reported values 
are three in order to calculate the probabilistic distribution in a lognormal form. 
Fault Type 
 
 Frequencies  
Lower Bound Median Value Upper Bound 
Spill on roof 1.1 10-3 1.6 10-3 2.3 10-3 
Sunken roof 5 10-4 9 10-4 1.4 10-3 
Vessel leakage 9 10-4 1.4 10-3 2 10-3 
Pipe release (all causes) * 2·10-8 4.8·10-8 1.12·10-7 
Valve release ** 2.4·10-8 1.0·10-7 4.1·10-7 
Acoustic alarm failure 3.8·10-6 2.1·10-5 5.3·10-5 
Operator error ***  0.001  
(*) pipes’ frequencies are calculated considering a length of 1m and a 0.4m diameter. 
(**) the valves used to regulate the income and the outcome from the tank are defined 
as a fail-to-close check valves. 
(***) the human error is defined as a probability. 
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Possible problems arise when the roof leaks, in terms of rupture of seals or roof sinking, or when the 
vessel itself develop a leakage. Other possibilities concern the fault in an external part of the vessel 
such as the pipe for the income and outcome or valves regulating these flows. Last but not least, the 
human error is a concrete factor: it is computed an accidental error of the operator and not a deliberate 
sabotage. 
In Figure 4.2, the fault tree for mechanical risk is reported. 
 
Figure 4.2: fault tree for a floating roof tank concerning only mechanical accidents. 
 
4.1.2 Seismic risk 
Applying the seismic risk to the mechanical fault tree allows some modification: in Figure 4.3 the 
complete fault tree with seismic effect is reported. This tree guarantees a god estimation of all possible 
damages due to earthquakes, wherever the plant is located. 
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Figure 4.3: fault tree for a floating roof tank located in a seismic area. 
In Figure 4.3 it is possible to notice that each branch of the fault tree is influenced by a new 
contribution due to seismic risk. Valves don’t present this risk because their seismic capacity is high 
and the effect of an earthquake on them is negligible compared with other equipment. 
Data used in calculation of components depending on the tank are: 
 σ1 = 0.358; this value represents the form factor in order to create the lognormal distribution. 
 µ2 = 0.38; mean value of fragility distribution for medium holes. 
 σ2 = 0.8; shape factor of fragility distribution for medium holes. 
 µ3 = 1.18; mean value of fragility distribution for large holes. 
 σ3 = 0.61; shape factor of fragility distribution for large holes. 
For pipes, the situation is similar in terms of data requirements, but values are different: 
 µ2 = 0.4522; mean value of fragility distribution for medium holes. 
 σ2 = 0.39; shape factor of fragility distribution for medium holes. 
 µ3 = 0.7116; mean value of fragility distribution for large holes. 
 σ3 = 0.20; shape factor of fragility distribution for large holes. 
These specific are referred to a pipe with an undefined diameter. Although there are specific curves 
for the diameter considered in this study (0.4 m), their contribution in the calculation of the risk will 
cause an inversion between the light risk and the medium one: this last will have a higher probability, 
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an illogical conclusion. To have a more precise idea of the condition that will cause a pipe leakage, 
in Figure 4.4 the fragility curves for these equipment are reported. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: fragility curves for pipes. It fits well with all possible diameters. The black 
curve represents the possibility of a large damage, the grey one the probability of a 
medium one. In abscissa the peak ground velocity (PGV) is reported. 
4.2 Pressurized tank 
The second case study concerns a pressurized spherical vessel for LPG storage. Some technical 
specifications are needed also in this case study to design a proper scenario. Tank data are reported 
in Table 4.3, with reference to the paragraph 2.3.2. 
Table 4.3: technical specification for the pressurized spherical tank of the case study. 
Radius 6.2 m 
Maximum storage 1000 m3 
With these data it is possible to assess an event tree concerning how the substance will interact with 
the surrounding area. Knowing the amount of stored compound is a key parameter in order to evaluate 
possible consequences and also the tank size in useful for pressure calculation. 
A simplified scheme of the equipment is reported in Figure 4.5. This image allows consideration on 
possible fault. 
PGV 
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Figure 4.5: simplified scheme of the pressurized vessel. In addition, also valves for 
the income and outcome of the substance, with relatives pipes, are reported, in order 
to represent the most likely scenario for the equipment construction. 
This figure allows a preliminary analysis that can be developed in a proper mechanical risk 
assessment. 
4.2.1 Stored substance and chemical risk 
The stored substance in this case study is LPG (liquefied petroleum gas). This substance is a mix of 
propane and butane with other component in negligible quantities. At atmospheric pressure and 
temperature, each of components is a gas phase. For transport and storage necessities, it is compressed 
and liquefied. 
LPG is a clean combustible with no environmental dangers and few residues. Its dangerous potential 
is due to the high pressure storage and to the high flammability. The GSH associate it with four hazard 
statement: 
 H220, extremely flammable gas. 
 H280, contains gas under pressure, may explode if heated. 
 H340, may cause cancer. 
 H350, may cause genetic defects. 
This substance is used in some civil applications in many countries for economic reasons. It is also 
adopter in rural heating plant: it is simple to provide a house with a little bullet tank for heating and 
cooking facilities. Another use regards the automotive sector: it is a combustible for internal 
combustion engines, spread all over the world. One more useful function is the refrigeration one: in 
industrial productions, exist some refrigerating mixes for off-the-grind processes. 
In terms of possible accidental scenarios, a fire or an explosion are the more probable ones: it is very 
simple for a dispersion of the gas to find a trigger and ignite. If the reaction causes an overpressure, 
then an UVCE will develop; else, all types of fire are possible. 
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The next step of the analysis is to identify possible faults that can cause the top event. Some 
frequencies reported in Table 4.4 are the same of the previous case because the equipment are the 
same. 
 
 
Table 4.4: failure frequencies of components involved in the study. Reported values 
are three in order to calculate the probabilistic distribution in a lognormal form. The 
tank presents three values, in order to represent all possible sizes for a leakage in a 
pressurized spherical vessel. 
Fault Type 
 Frequencies  
Lower Bound Median Value Upper Bound 
Small vessel leakage (< 25mm) 4.6·10-5 8.1·10-5 1.3·10-4 
Medium vessel leakage (25-50mm) 2.5·10-5 5.2·10-5 9.5·10-5 
Big vessel leakage (50-150mm) 1.4·10-6 9.7·10-6 3.6·10-5 
Pipe release (all causes) * 2·10-8 4.8·10-8 1.12·10-7 
Valve release ** 2.4·10-8 1.0·10-7 4.1·10-7 
Acoustic alarm failure 3.8·10-6 2.1·10-5 5.3·10-5 
Operator error ***  0.001  
(*) pipes’ frequencies are calculated considering a length of 1m and a 0.4m diameter. 
(**) the valves used to regulate the income and the outcome from the tank are defined 
as a fail-to-close check valves. 
(***) the human error is defined as a probability. 
 
 
Possible problems arise in the income/outcome line as in the previous case study. The situation of the 
vessel changes a lot in this case: there are three possible size for the leakage with three different 
probability distributions. It is important to implement well this fact in the code, in order to avoid 
possible miscalculations. 
The last possibility for a fault is the human error. As stated before, the considered error is an accidental 
one. The sabotage is not computed because it isn’t a mechanical or a seismic fault but a deliberate 
damage to the plant. 
In Figure 4.6 is reported the fault tree for only mechanical components. 
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Figure 4.6: fault tree for a pressurized spherical vessel only concerning mechanical 
accidents. 
 
 
4.2.2 Seismic risk 
Next step is the modification of fault tree in Figure 4.6 in order to add also seismic faults. Also in this 
case, the contribute of the operator error is negligible, as it is the possibility of a valve leakage. The 
results of this analysis are reported in Figure 4.7. 
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Figure 4.7: fault tree for a spherical pressurized vessel located in a seismic area. 
Value of fragility for pipes are considered the same of the previous case, with a pipe of 1m length 
and 0.4 m diameter. Fragility values for pressurized tank are different in respect to the previous one: 
 µ1 = 0.83; mean value of fragility distribution for small holes. 
 σ1 = 0.99; shape factor of fragility distribution for small holes. 
 µ2 = 1.85; mean value of fragility distribution for medium holes. 
 σ2 = 0.85; shape factor of fragility distribution for medium holes. 
 µ3 = 4.91; mean value of fragility distribution for large holes. 
 σ3 = 0.84; shape factor of fragility distribution for large holes. 
With these data, risk calculation is possible. 
4.3 Plant Location 
The choice for a proper location in order to represent in the better way the seismic risk is the key 
point for this analysis.  As stated in 2.2.2, there are two great seismic areas in Italy: the first one is in 
the north, in Friuli, where Osoppo (UD) is located; the second one comprehend the Apennines and 
the occidental part of Sicily where are located Priolo Gargallo (SR) and Falconara Marittima (AN). 
This last place isn’t part of the area with the highest seismic risk, but the proximity with the Apennines 
results in the possibility of huge earthquakes. To go further in the representation, it is important to 
locate the floating roof tank in an area that already is used with that intent. 
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4.3.1 Osoppo 
Osoppo, in Friuli, has already a storage area for various amount of substances. For this reason, the 
floating roof tank is placed there. From data of national institute of geology and volcanology (INGV) 
it is possible to find the map of the area in terms of possible values of PGA. It is possible to see, in 
Figure 4.8, how the seismic risk is very high and all industrial facility located there have to pay 
attention on the earthquake probability. Furthermore, all risk analysis has to satisfy the requirements 
of Seveso III, considering effects of seismic domino effects. 
 
Figure 4.8: seismic map of Osoppo. Possible PGAs in case of earthquake are 
represented in coloured squares. On the right, the legend presents the scale: the area 
is subject to earthquake with PGAs from 0.225g to 0.275g. 
Table 4.5: probabilities of an earthquake in Osoppo, sorted by magnitude in Richter 
scale (in the columns) and distance (in the rows) from the epicentre. The value of 
these quantities are the mean of border values of the interval. 
With this map, the INGV gives also a table concerning the probability of a seismic event, sorted by 
the distance and the magnitude. It is possible, so, noticing the influence of all possible seismic events 
on the system. In this case, the floating roof tank is influenced by earthquakes with epicentre 60 km 
Distance (km)\Magnitude 4,25 4,75 5,25 5,75 6,25 6,75 
5 10,20 24,3 19,67 13,4 7,75 1,03 
15 0,45 2,62 4,67 5,63 5,27 0,92 
25 0,00 0,01 0,31 1,10 1,67 0,36 
35 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,08 0,36 0,09 
45 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,06 0,03 
55 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 
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away from its location. These earthquakes have a magnitude that can vary from the fourth to the 
seventh degree of Richter’s scale. These values are reported in Table 4.5. 
A last consideration for seismic risk is the presence of a frequency factor: it represents the frequency 
of return of an earthquake with a chosen magnitude. The calculation of this vector can be performed 
using the Equation 4.1: 
 
௠݂ =
10(௔ି௕ெ)
50
 (4.1) 
With this equation it is possible to calculate the frequency distribution that is shown in Figure 4.9. 
 
 
Figure 4.9: graph of the earthquakes probability in Osoppo (UD). 
 
This equation highlights the frequency dependence upon three parameters. Terms a and b are constant 
derived by seismic analysis of the area. The third term is the simplest: in fact, M represents the 
magnitude of the earthquake as in Table 4.5. It is worth to be noticed the parameter 1/50: it represents 
the return period considered by INGV in the calculation of the earthquake matrix. 
With the map presented in Figure 4.10, below, is possible to identify the seismic area in which the 
plant is build and, then, choose right parameters. 
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Figure 4.10: seismic areas in Italy for frequencies calculation. In each area, 
parameters used for the calculation are different. 
Osoppo is located in the area 905. Required data are: 
 a = 4,76; 
 b = 1,06. 
The vector used in this case study and derived as described above is reported in Table 4.6. 
             Table 4.6: frequency vector of earthquake for Osoppo (UD). 
Magnitude 4.25 4.75 5.25 5.75 6.25 6.75 
Frequency 3.5977 10-2 1.0618 10-2 3.134 10-3 9.25 10-4 2.73 10-4 8.05 10-5 
4.3.2 Priolo 
The location chosen for the pressurized spherical tank is Priolo (SR), a town in Sicily. This choice is 
not casual: the natural conformation of the place, with a large gulf perfect for a harbour, was chosen 
in 1949 for one of the biggest industrial district of Italy. What was not taken into account is the seismic 
danger of the area. This risk has two components: the first one is due to the collision between the 
Euroasiatic and the African plaques (the so called “faglia dello Stretto” and “Ibleo Maltese”), the 
second is the presence of Mount Etna, the major active volcano in Italy. This combination of factor 
originates one of the highest seismic risk area of Italy. 
From data of INGV, it is possible to find the seismic map of the area, reported in Figure 4.11. 
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Figure 4.11: seismic map of Priolo. Possible PGAs in case of earthquake are 
represented in coloured squares. On the right, the legend presents the scale: the area 
is subject to earthquake with PGAs from 0.225g to 0.275g. 
The situation of two location seems similar from the comparison of two images. Table 4.7 will chance 
this impression. 
Table 4.7: probabilities of an earthquake in Priolo, sorted by magnitude in Richter 
scale (in the columns) and distance (in the rows) from the epicentre. The value of 
these quantities are the mean of border values of the interval. 
Distance (km)\Magnitude 4,25 4,75 5,25 5,75 6,25 6,75 7,25 7,75 
5 3,580 11,400 13,500 13,400 11,200 8,030 5,050 0,726 
15 0,037 0,579 1,920 3,670 5,160 5,760 5,250 0,912 
25 0,000 0,000 0,036 0,448 1,240 2,120 2,740 0,578 
35 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,010 0,210 0,605 1,040 0,253 
45 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,011 0,112 0,266 0,073 
55 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,010 0,014 0,062 0,190 
65 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,006 0,002 
75 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,002 0,002 
85 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 
The magnitude interval in this case comprehend also earthquake of the seventh degree of Richter’s 
scale with peak of eighth. These huge earthquakes can be perceived also from 90 km away from the 
epicentre. Compared from the previous case, the seismic risk associated with Priolo is much higher. 
The frequency for this area is influenced by following parameters, used in Equation 4.1: 
 a = 4,76; 
 b = 0,72. 
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These values were taken from the area 935 where Priolo is located. The resulting vector is reported 
in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.8: frequency vector of earthquake for Priolo (SR) sorted by magnitude. 
Magnitude 4,25 4,75 5,25 5,75 6,25 6,75 7,25 7,75 
Frequency 1.002374 0.437552 0.190999 0.083374 0.036394 0.015887 0.006935 0.003027 
4.3.3 Falconara Marittima 
The third location was chosen to have a different point of view: Falconara Marittima (AN) isn’t 
located in a high seismic area, so it is possible to evaluate how the risk changes. In Figure 4.12 the 
seismic risk of the area is reported. Falconara is also the seat of an API’s refinery. During recent 
earthquakes of central Italy some of the columns of the plant began to swing. This phenomenon can 
be explained looking to the Table 4.9: the seismic area of Falconara doesn’t expect earthquakes with 
a magnitude higher than 6,5, but the proximity with the Apennines leads to a low possibility of strong 
earthquakes (magnitude of 7,5) also from 110 km away. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12: seismic map of Falconara Marittima. Possible PGAs in case of 
earthquake are represented in coloured squares. On the right, the legend presents the 
scale: the area is subject to earthquake with PGAs from 0.125g to 0.200g. 
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Table 4.9: probabilities of an earthquake in Falconara Marittima, sorted by 
magnitude in Richter scale (in the columns) and distance (in the rows) from the 
epicentre. The value of these quantities are the mean of border values of the interval. 
Distance (km)\Magnitude 4,25 4,75 5,25 5,75 6,25 6,75 7,25 
5 11,300 24,600 17,500 10,700 1,470 0,000 0,000 
15 1,980 7,030 8,780 8,560 1,570 0,000 0,000 
25 0,012 0,427 1,410 2,240 0,873 0,000 0,000 
35 0,000 0,001 0,144 0,600 0,401 0,000 0,000 
45 0,000 0,000 0,002 0,118 0,161 0,000 0,000 
55 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,010 0,050 0,000 0,000 
65 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,005 0,000 0,000 
75 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,002 0,005 
85 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,007 
95 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,004 
105 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 
The frequency parameter was calculated using data from area 917 in the Figure 4.9: 
 a = 4,76; 
 b = 1,04. 
The results of the calculation are reported in Table 4.10. 
Table 4.10: frequency vector for Falconara Marittima (AN) sorted by magnitude. 
Magnitude 4,25 4,75 5,25 5,75 6,25 6,75 7,25 
Frequency 4.3755 10-2 1.3214 10-2 3.991 10-3 1.205 10-3 3.64 10-4 1.1 10-4 3.32 10-5 
Before to perform the analysis, some approximation in the method had to be done. 
 
4.4 Numerics approximation 
Before the result analysis, it is worth to introduce the approximations used for the risk calculation. 
There main problems to discuss are: 
1. The first one concerns how the fault tree is transposed in the code. The presence of only “or” 
operators allow to calculate the risk as the sum of all single values, without taking into account 
the order of contributes or any coupling. It is so simple to calculate apart the mechanical and the 
seismic risk, in order to represent their contribution to the final value. 
2. The second approximation is called Minimum cut-set and it is a technique of the Boolean algebra. 
The Minimum cut-set can be applied if there is a situation like the one in Figure 4.13, with an 
event linked two times with the same operator “or”. 
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Figure 4.13: example of situation where the Minimum cut-set can be applied. 
So it is possible to count only one time frequencies for this event. The result can be resumed in 
the Equation (4.2) below. This approximation is very useful and can simplify the risk analysis 
reducing the number of factors involved in each fault tree when they are written in the code. 
ܣ + ܣ = ܣ (4.2) 
3. Also the introduction of the operator error has to be described. This parameter interacts with the 
alarm failure through an “and” gate. So the result is a multiplication between a number and a 
frequency, in which each value of the vector is multiplied by a constant. The result obtained is 
used in the calculation of the risk under the Minimum cut-set, as other contributions. 
On the basis of these approximations, it is possible to analyse the results for the case studies. 
Chapter 5 
Results Presentation 
The results obtained in the case studies show how the location of the industrial storage tanks 
influences the risk: placing these equipment in a highly seismic area turns the mechanical risk in a 
negligible variable. Although the method adopted can guarantee a precise analysis of the risks, it is 
worth noticing that with other choices it is possible to obtain risk values comparable: in this case the 
sum on seismic and mechanical risk leads to a result in which the two contribution are visible. 
5.1 Floating roof tank results 
The analysis of seismic and mechanical risk for the floating roof tank is schematized in figures below. 
Figure 5.1 resume the risk caused by mechanical component, considering the fault tree of Figure 4.2. 
Due to the methodology adopted in calculation, the medium and high risk have the same value. Their 
influence is important for further analysis. 
In order to reach a complete risk analysis, it is possible to compare the deterministic and the 
probabilistic result. In Table 5.1 are reported numerical values for the three risk ranges. 
In particular, the case of a low release has an order of magnitude equal to 10-3 whereas the case of 
medium and high releases are equal to 10-4. It is a quite high value, but the system described in this 
analysis is very simple, without all safety equipment used to protect a tank storing Benzene. Also 
numerical values obtained with probabilistic and deterministic analysis are almost equals. 
 
 
Table 5.1: comparison between mechanical risk calculated using a probabilistic 
approach (mean is reported) or a deterministic one. 
Risk level Probabilistic value Deterministic value 
Low 2.9 10-3 3.3 10-3 
Medium 2.8105 10-4 3.12 10-4 
High 2.8105 10-4 3.12 10-4 
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Figure 5.1: mechanical fault probability in a floating roof tank, for different degree 
of severity: in green the probability of a small damage, in yellow the one for a medium 
leakage and in red the distribution for a huge damage. On the x-axis are reported the 
value of probability distribution, in the y-axis the probability of a result to verify. 
5.1.1 Tank located in Osoppo 
In the first case study, the floating roof tank is located in Osoppo. 
Figure 5.2 shows the seismic risk of the area for this type of tank. The seismic risk, shown in Figure 
5.3 is composed from contribution of probability of shell failure by fractures or holes (in Figure 5.2.a) 
and contribution of pipes failure probability (Figure 5.2.b). 
 
(a)                 (b) 
Figure 5.2: seismic failure probability distribution. In (a) it is possible to see the 
seismic failure probability for tank's shell, with different risk levels. In (b), the 
probability of a pipe leakage is reported. 
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Figure 5.3: seismic probability distributions. It represents the sum of risks due to 
earthquakes with the contribution of pipes and shell. On the x-axis are reported the 
value of probability distribution, in the y-axis the probability of a result to verify. 
From these graphs, it is possible to see that the seismic contribution for pipes have a strange shape: 
there are two peak, a greater one and a smaller one. This fact is due to the values use to calculate the 
distribution in the fragility curves. It is also possible to see how if the probability of a light damage 
of the pipes is higher than the one for a medium or heavy one. 
The shape of the shell damage probability (Figure 4.2.b), is more similar to a lognormal one with 
three different ranges and peaks. 
The distribution of the sum of seismic contribution presents a peculiarity only in the heavy damage 
probability: the pipe damage probability contribution is clearly visible with the presence of the peaks. 
The distributions are much larger, according with the operation done. 
In order to have a numerical representation of the risk, Table 5.2 reports the mean value of the risk 
(for the probabilistic approach) and the deterministic one. Values obtained are almost equal in the 
low and medium risk case. For the high risk, it is important to highlight that the peak value in the 
graph corresponds to the deterministic value, but the shape of the distribution changes the result of 
the probabilistic analysis. 
Table 5.2: comparison between seismic risk calculated using a probabilistic 
approach (mean is reported) or a deterministic one. 
Risk level Probabilistic value Deterministic value 
Low 1.04 10-2 1.16 10-2 
Medium 2.4 10-3 2.9 10-3 
High 2.6 10-3 0.90992 10-3 
The last image, Figure 5.4 represents the global risk of the top event computed with the seismic fault 
tree for floating roof tank (Figure 4.4). 
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Figure 5.4: probability of top event in a floating roof tank located in Osoppo (UD). 
On the x-axis are reported the value of probability distribution, in the y-axis the 
probability of a result to verify. 
The total value of the risk is almost equal to the seismic contribution, with little modification derived 
by the mechanical values. This fact will be discussed in the following section. The Table 5.3 resumes 
the results of the analysis. As stated before, the shape of the distribution chances the probabilistic 
high risk value. Despite this, values obtained are similar. 
Table 5.3: risk analysis for a floating roof tank in Osoppo (UD) calculated using a 
probabilistic approach (mean is reported) and a deterministic one. 
Risk level Probabilistic value Deterministic value 
Low 1.33 10-2 1.48 10-2 
Medium 2.7 10-3 3.2 10-3 
High 2.9 10-3 1.2 10-3 
5.1.2 Tank located in Falconara 
In Falconara Marittima (AN), the situation is a bit different. As can be seen in Figure 5.5, the seismic 
risk of this area is higher than the previous one. That situation is due to the presence, in the earthquake 
matrix (Table 4.9), of terms related with heavy seismic phenomena in the surrounding area. In fact, 
Falconara is located in a place affected by huge earthquakes happening in area 912, 914, 916, 919 
and 923 of Figure 4.10. 
The shape of the seismic distribution is the same as previously stated: pipes one (Figure 5.4.b) have 
two peaks due to fragility curves and the shell one is similar to the lognormal distribution (Figure 
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5.4.a). The sum of these contribution leads to Figure 5.6, where the two peaks are visible only in the 
high risk diagram. 
 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 5.5: seismic probability distributions. In (a) it is possible to see the seismic 
failure probability for pipes, with different levels of risk. In (b), the probability of a 
leakage of the shell is reported. 
 
Figure 5.6: seismic probability distributions. It represents the sum of risks due to 
earthquakes with the contribution of pipes and shell. On the x-axis are reported the 
value of probability distribution, in the y-axis the probability of a result to verify. 
In Table 5.4 are reported the numerical values for the seismic failure probability, either calculated 
with a probabilistic method or with a deterministic one. Values obtained are similar, apart for the high 
risk that suffers the calculation of the mean. 
Table 5.4: seismic risk analysis for a floating roof tank in Falconara Marittima (AN) 
calculated using a probabilistic approach (mean is reported) and a deterministic one. 
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Risk level Probabilistic value Deterministic value 
Low 1.64 10-2 1.81 10-2 
Medium 3.2 10-3 3.7 10-3 
High 3.2 10-3 1.0 10-3 
As can be expected also in this case, the probability of the top-event will be the seismic one, without 
any contribution given by the mechanical risk. This situation is represented in Figure 5.7 below. 
 
Figure 5.7: probability of top event in a floating roof tank located in Osoppo (UD). 
On the x-axis are reported the value of probability distribution, in the y-axis the 
probability of a result to verify. 
Also data in Table 5.5 are almost equals to the ones in Table 5.4 although they are taken from final 
result of the analysis or just after the seismic one. The mechanical contribution reflects in a small 
increase of values. 
Table 5.5: risk analysis for a floating roof tank in Falconara Marittima (AN) 
calculated using a probabilistic approach (mean is reported) and a deterministic one. 
Risk level Probabilistic value Deterministic value 
Low 1.93 10-2 2.13 10-2 
Medium 3.5 10-3 4.0 10-3 
High 3.5 10-3 1.3 10-3 
5.1.3 Risk comparison 
As can be seen, there is a huge difference between the results in mechanical terms and the seismic 
contribution. This difference is so high that the mechanical contribution seems to be almost negligible 
in the final calculations. This consideration will be discussed in section 5.3 because of these results 
are common with the one of the pressurized tank case study. 
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Also in the mechanical risk analysis, the values obtained for pipes and valves are overwhelmed by 
the ones calculated for shell and roof frequencies (as in Table 4.2). This happens because these 
equipment are well established and their safety is reproved. Also the non-presence of any safety 
measure for the tank enlarges the risk associated with the vessel. 
5.2 Pressurized tank results 
The pressurized tank requires more calculation to reach a proper evaluation: in this case, there are 
two contributions also for mechanical risk. The first one is given by valves and pipes, the second by 
the shell analysis. That happens because if the risk for external equipment is given with a single 
frequency (Table 4.4), from which three ranges have to be calculated, the shell presents three values, 
corresponding to the three levels of risk. In Figure 5.8, the results of the sum are reported. 
 
Figure 5.8: risk related to a pressurized tank due only to mechanical components. 
As opposed to the previous mechanical risk analysis, the presence of three risk ranges creates very 
different results. Each risk, low, medium and high, have a different order of magnitude, respectively 
10-3, 10-4 and 10-5. To better appreciate these differences, in Table 5.6 each numerical value is 
reported. The deterministic values are in some case similar to the probabilistic one apart for the high 
risk: in this case the deterministic result is four times the probabilistic one. This difference is due to 
the mechanism adopted in the risk summation: as stated in section 3.3.3, a correction factor is used 
when a sum is performed. This factor changes the final results where the order of magnitude is very 
low. 
Table 5.6: mechanical risk analysis for a pressurized tank calculated using a 
probabilistic approach (mean is reported) and a deterministic one. 
Risk level Probabilistic value Deterministic value 
Low 1.1948 10-4 0.81301 10-4 
Medium 5.7423 10-5 5.2029 10-5 
High 2.8783 10-6 9.7286 10-6 
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5.2.1 Tank located in Priolo Gargallo 
The seismic contribution is resumed in Figure 5.9: Figure 5.9.a shows the contribution of shell failure 
probability, Figure 5.9.b shows pipes failure probability. Instead, Figure 5.10 represents the sum of 
these two contribution. 
 
(a)            (b) 
Figure 5.9: seismic risk for Priolo Gargallo (SR) with two different contributions: 
pipes in (a) and shell in (b). 
 
 
Figure 5.10: seismic risk for Priolo Gargallo (SR). The graph represents the total 
seismic risk for a pressure tank. 
For the shell (Figure 5.9.a) it is possible to see how there are three different order of magnitude 
involved with the risk: the low one have a 10-1 value, the medium one 10-2 and the high risk 10-3. 
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Pipes failure probability values (Figure 5.9.b) are due to their diameter and the fragility curves linked 
to it, so it is possible to see how the shape of the distribution is similar to the one obtained before, 
with the two peaks. What changes is the range of the seismic risk associated with them. The third risk 
have values similar to the second one, the order of magnitude in the image may mislead. The results 
of the sum, Figure 5.10, show a low and medium risk that are comparable, while the high one is the 
same of pipes. Pipes seismic values overwhelm shell ones. 
In Table 5.7 are reported numerical results of the analysis. Values obtained are a consequence of what 
stated above: the inversion of magnitude of medium and high risk depends on the high results of 
pipes. 
Table 5.7: seismic risk analysis for a pressurized tank located in Priolo Gargallo 
(SR), calculated using a probabilistic approach (mean is reported) and a 
deterministic one. 
Risk level Probabilistic value Deterministic value 
Low 0.1683 0.2100 
Medium 3.02 10-2 4.24 10-2 
High 4.70 10-2 3.38 10-2 
The last point of this case study is the global risk, presented in Figure 5.11. 
 
Figure 5.11: probability of top event for a pressurized tank in Priolo Gargallo (SR). 
On the x-axis are reported the value of probability distribution, in the y-axis the 
probability of a result to verify. 
Seismic graph of Figure 5.10 is equal to Figure 5.11 representing the global value of risk. 
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To have a numerical idea of what happen in this case, in Table 5.8 are reported the values obtained 
with the probabilistic analysis and the one obtained with the deterministic one. It is possible to make 
the same consideration made above concerning results, with almost no variation from the seismic 
case.  
Table 5.8: risk analysis for a pressurized tank in Priolo Gargallo (SR) calculated 
using a probabilistic approach (mean is reported) and a deterministic one. 
Risk level Probabilistic value Deterministic value 
Low 0.1684 0.2101 
Medium 3.03 10-2 4.25 10-2 
High 4.70 10-2 3.38 10-2 
5.2.2 Tank located in Falconara Marittima 
In Figure 5.12.a the shell reaction to an earthquake is analysed. The medium risk results a little higher 
to the low one. The pipes (Figure 5.12.b) have the same graph of Figure 5.5.b, because the same pipe 
diameter and location are considered. The sum of these two contributions is presented in Figure 5.13, 
where the heavy risk of pipes overwhelms the one of the shell. 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 5.12: seismic probability distributions. In (a) it is possible to see the seismic 
failure probability for pipes, with different levels of risk. In (b), the probability of a 
leakage of the shell is reported. 
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Figure 5.13: the total seismic risk for a pressure tank located in Falconara Marittima. 
 
 
In Table 5.9 numerical results of the analysis are reported. 
Table 5.9: seismic risk analysis for a pressurized tank in Falconara Marittima (AN) 
calculated using a probabilistic approach (mean is reported) and a deterministic one. 
Risk level Probabilistic value Deterministic value 
Low 1.74 10-2 2.08 10-2 
Medium 1.18 10-2 7.5831 10-4 
High 2.0 10-3 5.4470 10-4 
 
 
In this case, the summation mechanism results in probabilistic values that are very different from 
deterministic ones for medium and high risk. The shape of distribution can be the cause for the high 
risk difference, but the major peak corresponds with the deterministic value. 
The last point is the global risk, presented in Figure 5.14. 
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Figure 5.14: probability of top event for a pressurized tank in Falconara Marittima 
(AN). On the x-axis are reported the value of probability distribution, in the y-axis the 
probability of a result to verify. 
In this case, the seismic contribution overwhelms the mechanical one. The Table 5.10 below resumes 
the results and show this phenomenon when compared with Table 5.9. There are some little 
differences, derived by mechanical influence, but they are negligible in the risk analysis. 
Table 5.10: risk analysis for a pressurized tank in Falconara Marittima (AN) 
calculated using a probabilistic approach (mean is reported) and a deterministic one. 
Risk level Probabilistic value Deterministic value 
Low 1.75 10-2 2.09 10-2 
Medium 1.18 10-2 8.1030 10-4 
High 2.0 10-3 5.5442 10-4 
5.2.1 Risk comparison 
In these case studies, it is possible to see how the choice of the location where perform the analysis 
is fundamental: choosing an area with low seismic risk allows to appreciate the combination between 
mechanical and seismic failures. 
Priolo, as expected, results the area with the highest seismic risk, too high that the mechanical 
contribution becomes negligible. 
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5.3 Final considerations 
In order to resume the results, in Table 5.11 are reported the final values for the risk for each case 
study. 
Table 5.11: resume of results for release probability of tanks in different locations. 
The comparison between the probabilistic results (mean is reported) and 
deterministic one is possible. In (a) result of the floating roof tank in Osoppo (UD) 
are reported, in (b) the ones of the floating roof tank in Falconara Marittima (AN).  
Risk level Probabilistic value Deterministic value 
Low 1.33 10-2 1.48 10-2 
Medium 2.7 10-3 3.2 10-3 
High 2.9 10-3 1.2 10-3 
(a) 
Risk level Probabilistic value Deterministic value 
Low 1.93 10-2 2.13 10-2 
Medium 3.5 10-3 4.0 10-3 
High 3.5 10-3 1.3 10-3 
(b) 
Results of the pressurized tank in Priolo Gargallo (SR) are in table (c) and in 
Falconara maritime (AN) in table (d). 
Risk level Probabilistic value Deterministic value 
Low 0.1684 0.2101 
Medium 3.03 10-2 4.25 10-2 
High 4.70 10-2 3.38 10-2 
(c) 
Risk level Probabilistic value Deterministic value 
Low 1.75 10-2 2.09 10-2 
Medium 1.18 10-2 8.1030 10-4 
High 2.0 10-3 5.5442 10-4 
(d) 
It is also possible to make some general considerations: 
 In a highly seismic area as Priolo Gargallo (SR), final results for the risk are at least one order 
of magnitude higher than other locations. 
 Falconara Marittima (AN) presents results that are much higher than expected. This fact is 
due to the presence of different seismic zones in the area surrounding the tank. It results a sum 
of various contribution that reaches a probability one and a half higher than Osoppo (UD). 
 In general, it is possible to state that mechanical risk causes only little variations in risk 
calculation. In the analysis both mechanical and seismic risk were overestimate, so it is 
possible to assess that with a more rigorous analysis this disproportion won’t change. 
 In general, for the low risk case deterministic and probabilistic values are comparable. In other 
cases, the shape of the distribution generates the difference between these two values. In fact, 
if the value of the main peak were reported, it will be similar to the deterministic one. 
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 When the difference between deterministic and probabilistic values are too high and also the 
peak doesn’t correspond, it is due to the simplification adopted to avoid double counting. 
In this way, a combination of natural risk and chemical one is possible. This first try could be a 
beginning in the integration of natural events in the calculation of risk, as “Seveso II Directive” states. 
Conclusions 
The aim of this work was to evaluate the risk for some chemical equipment located in seismic areas, 
as requested in “Seveso III Directive”. 
The main problem that arose during the risk analysis was how to combine deterministic values derived 
by mechanical risk assessment and probabilistic distribution of earthquakes. The main assumption 
was to transform mechanical values in a probabilistic way. It was possible tanks to the presence of 
upper and lower values of failure frequencies that allow to reach a probability distribution one the 
average and the standard deviation are calculated. This choice was made because failure frequencies 
are derived by a structural analysis with a well-established procedure. Years of accidental data 
collection and innovation gave reliable results. On the other hand, in terms of seismic analysis, data 
are derived by historical series. These studies analyse all earthquakes with quantitative instrumental 
data starting only one hundred years ago, so they are based on few events. Their values are more 
general. 
In order to reach a unique result, a fault tree analysis was performed to highlight all critical issues of 
a floating roof tank and a pressurized one. Furthermore, the seismic component was added to these 
trees to obtain a more general representation. Thanks to this method the risk became a sum of single 
contribution that can be analysed using a Matlab code specially developed. 
First of all, it was important to study seismic data of the three location chosen: Osoppo (UD), Priolo 
Gargallo (SR) and Falconara Marittima (AN). In the firs case it was found that the risk associated to 
seismic events had a medium value; in Priolo the seismic risk is one of the highest of Italy; Falconara 
Marittima represents a peculiar case. In fact, it isn’t a highly seismic area, but it is surrounded by 
location that are subject to a high seismic risk. This fact results in the possibility that also far 
earthquakes can have consequences on this site. Floating roof tank was placed in Osoppo and 
Falconara Marittima, the pressurized one in Priolo Gargallo and again in Falconara Marittima. So 
Falconara represent the comparison terms for risk associated with atmospheric and pressurized tank. 
The designed code summed results of the seismic analysis with the one of the mechanical failure 
probability: as stated above, a distribution cure of frequencies is obtained. The result expresses the 
probability of a top-event in each of the four case studies. 
It was possible to compare the results obtained with a probabilistic analysis to that obtained with the 
deterministic one. In tables of Chapter 5 the results show the mean value of two methodologies and 
they are comparable. 
In general, the preliminary results are promising and further studies are recommended in order to 
perform an analysis that takes into account all these safety equipment that are common in tank design. 
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In this work they were not considered because the aim was to combine two aspects of the risk and to 
see if this approach could be useful. Also liquid shaking wasn’t considered in this analysis. 
Appendix 
Matlab codes 
A. Floating roof tank in Osoppo (UD) 
clear all 
close all 
 rand=input('number of iterations') 
 
% Earthquake 
 
% seismic Matrix 
R=xlsread('DistribuzioniOsoppo.xlsx', 'distanza', 'A1:A6'); 
M=xlsread('DistribuzioniOsoppo.xlsx', 'Magnitudo', 'A1:G1'); 
MP=xlsread('DistribuzioniOsoppo.xlsx', 'Matrice', 'A1:G6'); 
F=xlsread('DistribuzioniOsoppo.xlsx', 'Frequenza', 'A1:G1'); 
  
r=length(R); 
m=length(M); 
logPGA=[]; 
for i=1:r 
    for j=1:m 
        logPGA(i,j)=-3.37+(1.93-0.203*M(j)).*M(j)+(-
3.02+0.00744*M(j)^3)*log10(sqrt(R(i)^2+7.3^2)); 
    end 
end 
  
sigmashell=0.358; % % Shape value of LogPGA 
mu2shell=0.38; % Mean value of Fragility Medium hole 
sigma2shell=0.8; % shape value of Fragility Medium hole 
mu3shell=1.18; % Mean value of Fragility large hole 
sigma3shell=0.61;  % Shape value of Fragility large hole 
PeqRS1shell=[]; 
PeqRS2shell=[]; 
PeqRS3shell=[]; 
PeqRS1shell=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS2shell=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS3shell=zeros(rand,1); 
  
for i=1:rand 
%     PGA1=10.^(logPGA+sigma); 
    PGA1shell=random ('norm',logPGA,sigmashell); 
    PGAshell=(10.^PGA1shell).*9.81; 
    RS3eqshell= cdf('logn',PGAshell,mu3shell,sigma3shell); 
    RS2eqshell=cdf('logn',PGAshell,mu2shell,sigma2shell); 
    Prs1shell=(1-RS2eqshell).*(MP./100); 
    Prs2shell=(RS2eqshell-RS3eqshell).*(MP./100); 
    Prs3shell=RS3eqshell.*(MP./100); 
    PfRS11shell=sum(Prs1shell).*F; 
    PfRS1shell=sum(PfRS11shell(:)); 
    PfRS22shell=sum(Prs2shell).*F; 
    PfRS2shell=sum(PfRS22shell(:)); 
    PfRS33shell=sum(Prs3shell).*F; 
    PfRS3shell=sum(PfRS33shell(:)); 
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    PeqRS1shell(i)=[PfRS1shell ]; 
    PeqRS2shell(i)=[PfRS2shell ]; 
    PeqRS3shell(i)=[PfRS3shell ]; 
    i=i+1; 
end 
  
PeqRSshell =[PeqRS1shell PeqRS2shell PeqRS3shell]; 
meaneqshell=mean(PeqRSshell); 
  
% Deterministic approach 
PGAdetshell=(10.^logPGA).*9.81; 
RS3eqdetshell= cdf('logn',PGAdetshell,mu3shell,sigma3shell); 
RS2eqdetshell=cdf('logn',PGAdetshell,mu2shell,sigma2shell); 
Prs1detshell=(1-RS2eqdetshell).*(MP./100); 
Prs2detshell=(RS2eqdetshell-RS3eqdetshell).*(MP./100); 
Prs3detshell=RS3eqdetshell.*(MP./100); 
PfRS11detshell= sum(Prs1detshell).*F; 
PfRS1detshell=sum(PfRS11detshell(:)); 
PfRS22detshell= sum(Prs2detshell).*F; 
PfRS2detshell=sum(PfRS22detshell(:)); 
PfRS33detshell= sum(Prs3detshell).*F; 
PfRS3detshell=sum(PfRS33detshell(:)); 
PeqRSdetshell =[PfRS1detshell PfRS2detshell PfRS3detshell]; 
  
[countsa,centersa] = hist(PeqRS1shell,20); 
[countsb,centersb] = hist(PeqRS2shell,20); 
[countsc,centersc] = hist(PeqRS3shell,20); 
[countspga,centerspga] = hist(PGA1shell,20); 
  
ya=linspace(0,(max(countsa/rand)+0.05)); 
yb=linspace(0,(max(countsb/rand)+0.05)); 
yc=linspace(0,(max(countsc/rand)+0.05)); 
  
  
figure (1) 
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersa,(countsa/rand),'g'); 
title ('Shell Failure Probability') 
hold on 
plot (meaneqshell(1),ya,'b',PeqRSdetshell(1),ya,'k'); 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centersb,(countsb/rand),'y') 
hold on  
plot (meaneqshell(2),yb,'b',PeqRSdetshell(2),yb,'k') 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centersc,(countsc/rand),'r') 
hold on  
plot (meaneqshell(3),yc,'b',PeqRSdetshell(3),yc,'k') 
hold off 
 
% Pipes 
 
sigma=0.358; % % Shape value of LogPGA 
mu2=0.4522; % Mean value of Fragility Medium hole 
sigma2=0.39; % shape value of Fragility Medium hole 
mu3=0.7116; % Mean value of Fragility large hole 
sigma3=0.20;  % Shape value of Fragility large hole 
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PeqRS1pipe=[]; 
PeqRS2pipe=[]; 
PeqRS3pipe=[]; 
PeqRS1pipe=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS2pipe=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS3pipe=zeros(rand,1); 
  
for i=1:rand 
%     PGA1=10.^(logPGA+sigma); 
    PGA1pipe=random ('norm',logPGA,sigma); 
    PGApipe=(10.^PGA1pipe).*9.81; 
    RS3eqpipe= cdf('logn',PGApipe,mu3,sigma3); 
    RS2eqpipe=cdf('logn',PGApipe,mu2,sigma2); 
    Prs1pipe=(1-RS2eqpipe).*(MP./100); 
    Prs2pipe=(RS2eqpipe-RS3eqpipe).*(MP./100); 
    Prs3pipe=RS3eqpipe.*(MP./100); 
    PfRS11pipe=sum(Prs1pipe).*F; 
    PfRS1pipe=sum(PfRS11pipe(:)); 
    PfRS22pipe=sum(Prs2pipe).*F; 
    PfRS2pipe=sum(PfRS22pipe(:)); 
    PfRS33pipe=sum(Prs3pipe).*F; 
    PfRS3pipe=sum(PfRS33pipe(:)); 
    PeqRS1pipe(i)=[PfRS1pipe ]; 
    PeqRS2pipe(i)=[PfRS2pipe ]; 
    PeqRS3pipe(i)=[PfRS3pipe ]; 
    i=i+1; 
end 
  
PeqRSpipe =[PeqRS1pipe PeqRS2pipe PeqRS3pipe]; 
meaneqpipe=mean(PeqRSpipe); 
  
% Deterministic approach  
PGAdetpipe=(10.^logPGA).*9.81; 
RS3eqdetpipe= cdf('logn',PGAdetpipe,mu3,sigma3); 
RS2eqdetpipe=cdf('logn',PGAdetpipe,mu2,sigma2); 
Prs1detpipe=(1-RS2eqdetpipe).*(MP./100); 
Prs2detpipe=(RS2eqdetpipe-RS3eqdetpipe).*(MP./100); 
Prs3detpipe=RS3eqdetpipe.*(MP./100); 
PfRS11detpipe= sum(Prs1detpipe).*F; 
PfRS1detpipe=sum(PfRS11detpipe(:)); 
PfRS22detpipe= sum(Prs2detpipe).*F; 
PfRS2detpipe=sum(PfRS22detpipe(:)); 
PfRS33detpipe= sum(Prs3detpipe).*F; 
PfRS3detpipe=sum(PfRS33detpipe(:)); 
PeqRSdetpipe =[PfRS1detpipe PfRS2detpipe PfRS3detpipe]; 
  
[countsa,centersa] = hist(PeqRS1pipe,20); 
[countsb,centersb] = hist(PeqRS2pipe,20); 
[countsc,centersc] = hist(PeqRS3pipe,20); 
[countspga,centerspga] = hist(PGA1pipe,20); 
  
ya=linspace(0,(max(countsa/rand)+0.05)); 
yb=linspace(0,(max(countsb/rand)+0.05)); 
yc=linspace(0,(max(countsc/rand)+0.05)); 
  
figure (2) 
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersa,(countsa/rand),'g'); 
title ('Pipe Failure Probability') 
hold on 
plot (meaneqpipe(1),ya,'b',PeqRSdetpipe(1),ya,'k'); 
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hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centersb,(countsb/rand),'y') 
hold on  
plot (meaneqpipe(2),yb,'b',PeqRSdetpipe(2),yb,'k') 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centersc,(countsc/rand),'r') 
hold on  
plot (meaneqpipe(3),yc,'b',PeqRSdetpipe(3),yc,'k') 
hold off 
 
% Sum seismic risk 
 
%Probabilistic 
PeqRS1= PeqRS1shell+PeqRS1pipe-(PeqRS1shell.*PeqRS1pipe); 
PeqRS2= PeqRS2shell+PeqRS2pipe-(PeqRS2shell.*PeqRS2pipe); 
PeqRS3= PeqRS3shell+PeqRS3pipe-(PeqRS3shell.*PeqRS3pipe); 
  
PeqRS =[PeqRS1 PeqRS2 PeqRS3]; 
meaneq=mean(PeqRS); 
  
%Deterministic 
PeqRS1det= PfRS1detshell+PfRS1detpipe-(PfRS1detshell.*PfRS1detpipe); 
PeqRS2det= PfRS2detshell+PfRS2detpipe-(PfRS2detshell.*PfRS2detpipe); 
PeqRS3det= PfRS3detshell+PfRS3detpipe-(PfRS3detshell.*PfRS3detpipe); 
PeqRSdet =[PeqRS1det PeqRS2det PeqRS3det]; 
  
[countsa,centersa] = hist(PeqRS1,20); 
[countsb,centersb] = hist(PeqRS2,20); 
[countsc,centersc] = hist(PeqRS3,20); 
[countspga,centerspga] = hist(PGA1pipe,20); 
  
ya=linspace(0,(max(countsa/rand)+0.05)); 
yb=linspace(0,(max(countsb/rand)+0.05)); 
yc=linspace(0,(max(countsc/rand)+0.05)); 
  
  
figure (3) 
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersa,(countsa/rand),'g'); 
title ('Seismic Failure Probability') 
hold on 
plot (meaneq(1),ya,'b',PeqRSdet(1),ya,'k'); 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centersb,(countsb/rand),'y') 
hold on  
plot (meaneq(2),yb,'b',PeqRSdet(2),yb,'k') 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centersc,(countsc/rand),'r') 
hold on  
plot (meaneq(3),yc,'b',PeqRSdet(3),yc,'k') 
hold off 
 
Matlab Codes  77 
 
% Failure rate of mechanical component 
 
%longnormal distribution 
m= [0.0016 0.0009 0.0014 0.000000048 0.0000001 0.00000021]; %event/years 
LB=[0.0011 0.0005 0.0009 0.00000002 0.000000024 0.000000038]; %event/years 
UB=[0.0023 0.0014 0.002 0.000000112 0.00000041 0.00000053]; %event/years 
  
ef=sqrt(UB./LB); 
sig=log(ef)/1.645; 
v=(m.^2).*(exp(sig.^2)-1); 
sigmashell=sig; 
mu = log((m.^2)./sqrt(v+m.^2)); 
  
T=50; 
X=[]; 
for i=1:rand 
    for j=1:length(m) 
        X(i,j)=random ('logn',mu(j),sigmashell(j)); 
          if (X(j)<=UB(j) && X(j)>=LB(j)) 
            X(i,j)=X(i,j); 
          else 
              if (X(j)<UB(j)) 
                  X(i,j)=UB(j); 
              end 
              if (X(j)>LB(j)) 
                  X(i,j)=LB(j); 
              end 
          end 
          P1(i,j) = X(i,j); 
          RS1(i,j) = P1(i,j).*0.84; 
          RS2(i,j) = P1(i,j).*0.08; 
          RS3(i,j) = P1(i,j).*0.08; 
    end 
end 
PmRS1=sum(RS1,2)-(RS1(:,1).*RS1(:,2))-(RS1(:,2).*RS1(:,3))-
(RS1(:,3).*RS1(:,1))-(RS1(:,4).*RS1(:,1))-(RS1(:,5).*RS1(:,1))-
(RS1(:,4).*RS1(:,2))-(RS1(:,5).*RS1(:,2))-(RS1(:,4).*RS1(:,3))-
(RS1(:,5).*RS1(:,3))-(RS1(:,4).*RS1(:,5))-(RS1(:,1).*RS1(:,6))-
(RS1(:,2).*RS1(:,6))-(RS1(:,3).*RS1(:,6))-(RS1(:,4).*RS1(:,6))-
(RS1(:,5).*RS1(:,6)); 
PmRS2=sum(RS2,2)-(RS2(:,1).*RS2(:,2))-(RS2(:,2).*RS2(:,3))-
(RS2(:,3).*RS2(:,1))-(RS2(:,4).*RS2(:,1))-(RS2(:,5).*RS2(:,1))-
(RS2(:,4).*RS2(:,2))-(RS2(:,5).*RS2(:,2))-(RS2(:,4).*RS2(:,3))-
(RS2(:,5).*RS2(:,3))-(RS2(:,4).*RS2(:,5))-(RS2(:,1).*RS2(:,6))-
(RS2(:,2).*RS2(:,6))-(RS2(:,3).*RS2(:,6))-(RS2(:,4).*RS2(:,6))-
(RS2(:,5).*RS2(:,6)); 
PmRS3=sum(RS3,2)-(RS3(:,1).*RS3(:,2))-(RS3(:,2).*RS3(:,3))-
(RS3(:,3).*RS3(:,1))-(RS3(:,4).*RS3(:,1))-(RS3(:,5).*RS3(:,1))-
(RS3(:,4).*RS3(:,2))-(RS3(:,5).*RS3(:,2))-(RS3(:,4).*RS3(:,3))-
(RS3(:,5).*RS3(:,3))-(RS3(:,4).*RS3(:,5))-(RS3(:,1).*RS3(:,6))-
(RS3(:,2).*RS3(:,6))-(RS3(:,3).*RS3(:,6))-(RS3(:,4).*RS3(:,6))-
(RS3(:,5).*RS3(:,6)); 
  
PmRS=[PmRS1 PmRS2 PmRS3];  
meanm=mean(PmRS); 
  
% Deterministic approach 
P1det = m; 
RS1det = P1det.*0.84; 
RS2det = P1det.*0.08; 
RS3det = P1det.*0.08; 
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PmRS1det=sum(RS1det,2)-(RS1det(:,1).*RS1det(:,2))-
(RS1det(:,2).*RS1det(:,3))-(RS1det(:,3).*RS1det(:,1))-
(RS1det(:,4).*RS1det(:,1))-(RS1det(:,5).*RS1det(:,1))-
(RS1det(:,4).*RS1det(:,2))-(RS1det(:,5).*RS1det(:,2))-
(RS1det(:,4).*RS1det(:,3))-(RS1det(:,5).*RS1det(:,3))-
(RS1det(:,4).*RS1det(:,5))-(RS1det(:,1).*RS1det(:,6))-
(RS1det(:,2).*RS1det(:,6))-(RS1det(:,3).*RS1det(:,6))-
(RS1det(:,4).*RS1det(:,6))-(RS1det(:,6).*RS1det(:,5)); 
PmRS2det=sum(RS2det,2)-(RS2det(:,1).*RS2det(:,2))-
(RS2det(:,2).*RS2det(:,3))-(RS2det(:,3).*RS2det(:,1))-
(RS2det(:,4).*RS2det(:,1))-(RS2det(:,5).*RS2det(:,1))-
(RS2det(:,4).*RS2det(:,2))-(RS2det(:,5).*RS2det(:,2))-
(RS2det(:,4).*RS2det(:,3))-(RS2det(:,5).*RS2det(:,3))-
(RS2det(:,4).*RS2det(:,5))-(RS2det(:,1).*RS2det(:,6))-
(RS2det(:,3).*RS2det(:,6))-(RS2det(:,3).*RS2det(:,6))-
(RS2det(:,4).*RS2det(:,6))-(RS2det(:,6).*RS2det(:,5)); 
PmRS3det=sum(RS3det,2)-(RS3det(:,1).*RS3det(:,2))-
(RS3det(:,2).*RS3det(:,3))-(RS3det(:,3).*RS3det(:,1))-
(RS3det(:,4).*RS3det(:,1))-(RS3det(:,5).*RS3det(:,1))-
(RS3det(:,4).*RS3det(:,2))-(RS3det(:,5).*RS3det(:,2))-
(RS3det(:,4).*RS3det(:,3))-(RS3det(:,5).*RS3det(:,3))-
(RS3det(:,4).*RS3det(:,5))-(RS3det(:,1).*RS3det(:,6))-
(RS3det(:,2).*RS3det(:,6))-(RS3det(:,3).*RS3det(:,6))-
(RS3det(:,4).*RS3det(:,4))-(RS3det(:,6).*RS3det(:,5)); 
  
PmRSdet =[PmRS1det PmRS2det PmRS3det]; 
  
[countsd,centersd] = hist(PmRS1,20); 
[countse,centerse] = hist(PmRS2,20); 
[countsf,centersf] = hist(PmRS3,20); 
  
yd=linspace(0,(max(countsd/rand)+0.05),100); 
ye=linspace(0,(max(countse/rand)+0.05),100); 
yf=linspace(0,(max(countsf/rand)+0.05),100); 
  
figure (4) 
  
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersd,(countsd/rand),'g'); 
title ('Failure Probability of Mechanical Components ') 
hold on 
plot (meanm(1),yd,'b'); 
hold on 
plot (PmRSdet(1),yd,'k'); 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centerse,(countse/rand),'y') 
hold on  
plot (meanm(2),ye,'b') 
hold on 
plot (PmRSdet(2),ye,'k') 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centersf,(countsf/rand),'r') 
hold on  
plot (meanm(3),yf,'b') 
hold on 
plot (PmRSdet(3),yf,'k') 
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hold off 
 
% Probability of release from atmospheric tank 
 
PRS1=PeqRS1+PmRS1-(PeqRS1.*PmRS1); 
PRS2=PeqRS2+PmRS2-(PeqRS2.*PmRS2); 
PRS3=PeqRS3+PmRS3-(PeqRS3.*PmRS3); 
P=[PRS1 PRS2 PRS3]; 
meanP=mean(P); 
  
% Deterministic approach 
PRS1det=PeqRS1det+PmRS1det-(PeqRS1det*PmRS1det); 
PRS2det=PeqRS2det+PmRS2det-(PeqRS2det*PmRS2det); 
PRS3det=PeqRS3det+PmRS3det-(PeqRS3det*PmRS3det); 
PRSdet=[PRS1det PRS2det PRS3det]; 
  
[counts1,centers1] = hist(PRS1,20); 
[counts2,centers2] = hist(PRS2,20); 
[counts3,centers3] = hist(PRS3,20); 
  
y1=linspace(0,(max(counts1/rand)+0.05),100); 
y2=linspace(0,(max(counts2/rand)+0.05),100); 
y3=linspace(0,(max(counts3/rand)+0.05),100); 
  
figure (5) 
  
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centers1,(counts1/rand),'g') 
title ('Probability of top-event') 
hold on  
plot (meanP(1),y1,'b') 
hold on 
plot (PRSdet(1),y1,'k') 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centers2,(counts2/rand),'y') 
hold on  
plot (meanP(2),y2,'b') 
hold on 
plot (PRSdet(2),y2,'k') 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centers3,(counts3/rand),'r') 
hold on  
plot (meanP(3),y3,'b') 
hold on 
plot (PRSdet(3),y3,'k') 
hold off 
B. Floating roof tank in Falconara Marittima (AN) 
clear all 
close all 
  
rand=input('number of iterations') 
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% Earthquake 
 
% Seismic Matrix 
R=xlsread('DistribuzioniFalconara.xlsx', 'distanza', 'A1:A11'); 
M=xlsread('DistribuzioniFalconara.xlsx', 'Magnitudo', 'A1:H1'); 
MP=xlsread('DistribuzioniFalconara.xlsx', 'Matrice', 'A1:H11'); 
F=xlsread('DistribuzioniFalconara.xlsx', 'Frequenza', 'A1:H1'); 
  
r=length(R); 
m=length(M); 
logPGA=[]; 
for i=1:r 
    for j=1:m 
        logPGA(i,j)=-3.37+(1.93-0.203*M(j)).*M(j)+(-
3.02+0.00744*M(j)^3)*log10(sqrt(R(i)^2+7.3^2)); 
    end 
end 
  
sigmashell=0.358; % % Shape value of LogPGA 
mu2shell=0.38; % Mean value of Fragility Medium hole 
sigma2shell=0.8; % shape value of Fragility Medium hole 
mu3shell=1.18; % Mean value of Fragility large hole 
sigma3shell=0.61;  % Shape value of Fragility large hole 
PeqRS1shell=[]; 
PeqRS2shell=[]; 
PeqRS3shell=[]; 
PeqRS1shell=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS2shell=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS3shell=zeros(rand,1); 
  
for i=1:rand 
    PGA1shell=random ('norm',logPGA,sigmashell); 
    PGAshell=(10.^PGA1shell).*9.81; 
    RS3eqshell= cdf('logn',PGAshell,mu3shell,sigma3shell); 
    RS2eqshell=cdf('logn',PGAshell,mu2shell,sigma2shell); 
    Prs1shell=(1-RS2eqshell).*(MP./100); 
    Prs2shell=(RS2eqshell-RS3eqshell).*(MP./100); 
    Prs3shell=RS3eqshell.*(MP./100); 
    PfRS11shell=sum(Prs1shell).*F; 
    PfRS1shell=sum(PfRS11shell(:)); 
    PfRS22shell=sum(Prs2shell).*F; 
    PfRS2shell=sum(PfRS22shell(:)); 
    PfRS33shell=sum(Prs3shell).*F; 
    PfRS3shell=sum(PfRS33shell(:)); 
    PeqRS1shell(i)=[PfRS1shell ]; 
    PeqRS2shell(i)=[PfRS2shell ]; 
    PeqRS3shell(i)=[PfRS3shell ]; 
    i=i+1; 
end 
  
PeqRSshell =[PeqRS1shell PeqRS2shell PeqRS3shell]; 
meaneqshell=mean(PeqRSshell); 
  
% Deterministic approach 
PGAdetshell=(10.^logPGA).*9.81; 
RS3eqdetshell= cdf('logn',PGAdetshell,mu3shell,sigma3shell); 
RS2eqdetshell=cdf('logn',PGAdetshell,mu2shell,sigma2shell); 
Prs1detshell=(1-RS2eqdetshell).*(MP./100); 
Prs2detshell=(RS2eqdetshell-RS3eqdetshell).*(MP./100); 
Prs3detshell=RS3eqdetshell.*(MP./100); 
PfRS11detshell= sum(Prs1detshell).*F; 
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PfRS1detshell=sum(PfRS11detshell(:)); 
PfRS22detshell= sum(Prs2detshell).*F; 
PfRS2detshell=sum(PfRS22detshell(:)); 
PfRS33detshell= sum(Prs3detshell).*F; 
PfRS3detshell=sum(PfRS33detshell(:)); 
PeqRSdetshell =[PfRS1detshell PfRS2detshell PfRS3detshell]; 
  
[countsa,centersa] = hist(PeqRS1shell,20); 
[countsb,centersb] = hist(PeqRS2shell,20); 
[countsc,centersc] = hist(PeqRS3shell,20); 
[countspga,centerspga] = hist(PGA1shell,20); 
  
ya=linspace(0,(max(countsa/rand)+0.05)); 
yb=linspace(0,(max(countsb/rand)+0.05)); 
yc=linspace(0,(max(countsc/rand)+0.05)); 
  
figure (1) 
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersa,(countsa/rand),'g'); 
title ('Shell Failure Probability') 
hold on 
plot (meaneqshell(1),ya,'b',PeqRSdetshell(1),ya,'k'); 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centersb,(countsb/rand),'y') 
hold on  
plot (meaneqshell(2),yb,'b',PeqRSdetshell(2),yb,'k') 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centersc,(countsc/rand),'r') 
hold on  
plot (meaneqshell(3),yc,'b',PeqRSdetshell(3),yc,'k') 
hold off 
 
% Pipes 
 
sigma=0.358; % % Shape value of LogPGA 
mu2=0.4522; % Mean value of Fragility Medium hole 
sigma2=0.39; % shape value of Fragility Medium hole 
mu3=0.7116; % Mean value of Fragility large hole 
sigma3=0.20;  % Shape value of Fragility large hole 
PeqRS1pipe=[]; 
PeqRS2pipe=[]; 
PeqRS3pipe=[]; 
PeqRS1pipe=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS2pipe=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS3pipe=zeros(rand,1); 
  
for i=1:rand 
    PGA1pipe=random ('norm',logPGA,sigma); 
    PGApipe=(10.^PGA1pipe).*9.81; 
    RS3eqpipe= cdf('logn',PGApipe,mu3,sigma3); 
    RS2eqpipe=cdf('logn',PGApipe,mu2,sigma2); 
    Prs1pipe=(1-RS2eqpipe).*(MP./100); 
    Prs2pipe=(RS2eqpipe-RS3eqpipe).*(MP./100); 
    Prs3pipe=RS3eqpipe.*(MP./100); 
    PfRS11pipe=sum(Prs1pipe).*F; 
    PfRS1pipe=sum(PfRS11pipe(:)); 
    PfRS22pipe=sum(Prs2pipe).*F; 
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    PfRS2pipe=sum(PfRS22pipe(:)); 
    PfRS33pipe=sum(Prs3pipe).*F; 
    PfRS3pipe=sum(PfRS33pipe(:)); 
    PeqRS1pipe(i)=[PfRS1pipe ]; 
    PeqRS2pipe(i)=[PfRS2pipe ]; 
    PeqRS3pipe(i)=[PfRS3pipe ]; 
    i=i+1; 
end 
  
PeqRSpipe =[PeqRS1pipe PeqRS2pipe PeqRS3pipe]; 
meaneqpipe=mean(PeqRSpipe); 
  
% Deterministic approach 
PGAdetpipe=(10.^logPGA).*9.81; 
RS3eqdetpipe= cdf('logn',PGAdetpipe,mu3,sigma3); 
RS2eqdetpipe=cdf('logn',PGAdetpipe,mu2,sigma2); 
Prs1detpipe=(1-RS2eqdetpipe).*(MP./100); 
Prs2detpipe=(RS2eqdetpipe-RS3eqdetpipe).*(MP./100); 
Prs3detpipe=RS3eqdetpipe.*(MP./100); 
PfRS11detpipe= sum(Prs1detpipe).*F; 
PfRS1detpipe=sum(PfRS11detpipe(:)); 
PfRS22detpipe= sum(Prs2detpipe).*F; 
PfRS2detpipe=sum(PfRS22detpipe(:)); 
PfRS33detpipe= sum(Prs3detpipe).*F; 
PfRS3detpipe=sum(PfRS33detpipe(:)); 
PeqRSdetpipe =[PfRS1detpipe PfRS2detpipe PfRS3detpipe]; 
  
[countsa,centersa] = hist(PeqRS1pipe,20); 
[countsb,centersb] = hist(PeqRS2pipe,20); 
[countsc,centersc] = hist(PeqRS3pipe,20); 
[countspga,centerspga] = hist(PGA1pipe,20); 
  
ya=linspace(0,(max(countsa/rand)+0.05)); 
yb=linspace(0,(max(countsb/rand)+0.05)); 
yc=linspace(0,(max(countsc/rand)+0.05)); 
  
figure (2) 
 
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersa,(countsa/rand),'g'); 
title ('Pipe Failure Probability') 
hold on 
plot (meaneqpipe(1),ya,'b',PeqRSdetpipe(1),ya,'k'); 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centersb,(countsb/rand),'y') 
hold on  
plot (meaneqpipe(2),yb,'b',PeqRSdetpipe(2),yb,'k') 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centersc,(countsc/rand),'r') 
hold on  
plot (meaneqpipe(3),yc,'b',PeqRSdetpipe(3),yc,'k') 
hold off 
 
% Sum seismic risk 
 
%Probabilistic 
PeqRS1= PeqRS1shell+PeqRS1pipe-(PeqRS1shell.*PeqRS1pipe); 
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PeqRS2= PeqRS2shell+PeqRS2pipe-(PeqRS2shell.*PeqRS2pipe); 
PeqRS3= PeqRS3shell+PeqRS3pipe-(PeqRS3shell.*PeqRS3pipe); 
  
PeqRS =[PeqRS1 PeqRS2 PeqRS3]; 
meaneq=mean(PeqRS); 
  
%Deterministic 
PeqRS1det= PfRS1detshell+PfRS1detpipe-(PfRS1detshell.*PfRS1detpipe); 
PeqRS2det= PfRS2detshell+PfRS2detpipe-(PfRS2detshell.*PfRS2detpipe); 
PeqRS3det= PfRS3detshell+PfRS3detpipe-(PfRS3detshell.*PfRS3detpipe); 
PeqRSdet =[PeqRS1det PeqRS2det PeqRS3det]; 
  
[countsa,centersa] = hist(PeqRS1,20); 
[countsb,centersb] = hist(PeqRS2,20); 
[countsc,centersc] = hist(PeqRS3,20); 
[countspga,centerspga] = hist(PGA1pipe,20); 
  
ya=linspace(0,(max(countsa/rand)+0.05)); 
yb=linspace(0,(max(countsb/rand)+0.05)); 
yc=linspace(0,(max(countsc/rand)+0.05)); 
  
figure (3) 
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersa,(countsa/rand),'g'); 
title ('Seismic Failure Probability') 
hold on 
plot (meaneq(1),ya,'b',PeqRSdet(1),ya,'k'); 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centersb,(countsb/rand),'y') 
hold on  
plot (meaneq(2),yb,'b',PeqRSdet(2),yb,'k') 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centersc,(countsc/rand),'r') 
hold on  
plot (meaneq(3),yc,'b',PeqRSdet(3),yc,'k') 
hold off 
 
% Failure rate of mechanical component 
 
%longnormal distribution 
m= [0.0016 0.0009 0.0014 0.000000048 0.0000001 0.00000021]; %event/years 
LB=[0.0011 0.0005 0.0009 0.00000002 0.000000024 0.000000038]; %event/years 
UB=[0.0023 0.0014 0.002 0.000000112 0.00000041 0.00000053]; %event/years 
  
ef=sqrt(UB./LB); 
sig=log(ef)/1.645; 
v=(m.^2).*(exp(sig.^2)-1); 
sigmashell=sig; 
mu = log((m.^2)./sqrt(v+m.^2)); 
  
T=50; 
X=[]; 
for i=1:rand 
    for j=1:length(m) 
        X(i,j)=random ('logn',mu(j),sigmashell(j)); 
          if (X(j)<=UB(j) && X(j)>=LB(j)) 
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            X(i,j)=X(i,j); 
          else 
              if (X(j)<UB(j)) 
                  X(i,j)=UB(j); 
              end 
              if (X(j)>LB(j)) 
                  X(i,j)=LB(j); 
              end 
          end 
          P1(i,j) = X(i,j); 
          RS1(i,j) = P1(i,j).*0.84; 
          RS2(i,j) = P1(i,j).*0.08; 
          RS3(i,j) = P1(i,j).*0.08; 
    end 
end 
PmRS1=sum(RS1,2)-(RS1(:,1).*RS1(:,2))-(RS1(:,2).*RS1(:,3))-
(RS1(:,3).*RS1(:,1))-(RS1(:,4).*RS1(:,1))-(RS1(:,5).*RS1(:,1))-
(RS1(:,4).*RS1(:,2))-(RS1(:,5).*RS1(:,2))-(RS1(:,4).*RS1(:,3))-
(RS1(:,5).*RS1(:,3))-(RS1(:,4).*RS1(:,5))-(RS1(:,1).*RS1(:,6))-
(RS1(:,2).*RS1(:,6))-(RS1(:,3).*RS1(:,6))-(RS1(:,4).*RS1(:,6))-
(RS1(:,5).*RS1(:,6)); 
PmRS2=sum(RS2,2)-(RS2(:,1).*RS2(:,2))-(RS2(:,2).*RS2(:,3))-
(RS2(:,3).*RS2(:,1))-(RS2(:,4).*RS2(:,1))-(RS2(:,5).*RS2(:,1))-
(RS2(:,4).*RS2(:,2))-(RS2(:,5).*RS2(:,2))-(RS2(:,4).*RS2(:,3))-
(RS2(:,5).*RS2(:,3))-(RS2(:,4).*RS2(:,5))-(RS2(:,1).*RS2(:,6))-
(RS2(:,2).*RS2(:,6))-(RS2(:,3).*RS2(:,6))-(RS2(:,4).*RS2(:,6))-
(RS2(:,5).*RS2(:,6)); 
PmRS3=sum(RS3,2)-(RS3(:,1).*RS3(:,2))-(RS3(:,2).*RS3(:,3))-
(RS3(:,3).*RS3(:,1))-(RS3(:,4).*RS3(:,1))-(RS3(:,5).*RS3(:,1))-
(RS3(:,4).*RS3(:,2))-(RS3(:,5).*RS3(:,2))-(RS3(:,4).*RS3(:,3))-
(RS3(:,5).*RS3(:,3))-(RS3(:,4).*RS3(:,5))-(RS3(:,1).*RS3(:,6))-
(RS3(:,2).*RS3(:,6))-(RS3(:,3).*RS3(:,6))-(RS3(:,4).*RS3(:,6))-
(RS3(:,5).*RS3(:,6)); 
  
PmRS=[PmRS1 PmRS2 PmRS3]; 
meanm=mean(PmRS); 
  
% Deterministic approach 
P1det = m; 
RS1det = P1det.*0.84; 
RS2det = P1det.*0.08; 
RS3det = P1det.*0.08; 
  
PmRS1det=sum(RS1det,2)-(RS1det(:,1).*RS1det(:,2))-
(RS1det(:,2).*RS1det(:,3))-(RS1det(:,3).*RS1det(:,1))-
(RS1det(:,4).*RS1det(:,1))-(RS1det(:,5).*RS1det(:,1))-
(RS1det(:,4).*RS1det(:,2))-(RS1det(:,5).*RS1det(:,2))-
(RS1det(:,4).*RS1det(:,3))-(RS1det(:,5).*RS1det(:,3))-
(RS1det(:,4).*RS1det(:,5))-(RS1det(:,1).*RS1det(:,6))-
(RS1det(:,2).*RS1det(:,6))-(RS1det(:,3).*RS1det(:,6))-
(RS1det(:,4).*RS1det(:,6))-(RS1det(:,6).*RS1det(:,5)); 
PmRS2det=sum(RS2det,2)-(RS2det(:,1).*RS2det(:,2))-
(RS2det(:,2).*RS2det(:,3))-(RS2det(:,3).*RS2det(:,1))-
(RS2det(:,4).*RS2det(:,1))-(RS2det(:,5).*RS2det(:,1))-
(RS2det(:,4).*RS2det(:,2))-(RS2det(:,5).*RS2det(:,2))-
(RS2det(:,4).*RS2det(:,3))-(RS2det(:,5).*RS2det(:,3))-
(RS2det(:,4).*RS2det(:,5))-(RS2det(:,1).*RS2det(:,6))-
(RS2det(:,3).*RS2det(:,6))-(RS2det(:,3).*RS2det(:,6))-
(RS2det(:,4).*RS2det(:,6))-(RS2det(:,6).*RS2det(:,5)); 
PmRS3det=sum(RS3det,2)-(RS3det(:,1).*RS3det(:,2))-
(RS3det(:,2).*RS3det(:,3))-(RS3det(:,3).*RS3det(:,1))-
(RS3det(:,4).*RS3det(:,1))-(RS3det(:,5).*RS3det(:,1))-
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(RS3det(:,4).*RS3det(:,2))-(RS3det(:,5).*RS3det(:,2))-
(RS3det(:,4).*RS3det(:,3))-(RS3det(:,5).*RS3det(:,3))-
(RS3det(:,4).*RS3det(:,5))-(RS3det(:,1).*RS3det(:,6))-
(RS3det(:,2).*RS3det(:,6))-(RS3det(:,3).*RS3det(:,6))-
(RS3det(:,4).*RS3det(:,4))-(RS3det(:,6).*RS3det(:,5)); 
  
PmRSdet =[PmRS1det PmRS2det PmRS3det]; 
  
[countsd,centersd] = hist(PmRS1,20); 
[countse,centerse] = hist(PmRS2,20); 
[countsf,centersf] = hist(PmRS3,20); 
  
yd=linspace(0,(max(countsd/rand)+0.05),100); 
ye=linspace(0,(max(countse/rand)+0.05),100); 
yf=linspace(0,(max(countsf/rand)+0.05),100); 
  
figure (4) 
  
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersd,(countsd/rand),'g'); 
title ('Failure Probability of Mechanical Components ') 
hold on 
plot (meanm(1),yd,'b'); 
hold on 
plot (PmRSdet(1),yd,'k'); 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centerse,(countse/rand),'y') 
hold on  
plot (meanm(2),ye,'b') 
hold on 
plot (PmRSdet(2),ye,'k') 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centersf,(countsf/rand),'r') 
hold on  
plot (meanm(3),yf,'b') 
hold on 
plot (PmRSdet(3),yf,'k') 
hold off 
 
% Probability of release from atmospheric tank 
 
PRS1=PeqRS1+PmRS1-(PeqRS1.*PmRS1); 
PRS2=PeqRS2+PmRS2-(PeqRS2.*PmRS2); 
PRS3=PeqRS3+PmRS3-(PeqRS3.*PmRS3); 
P=[PRS1 PRS2 PRS3]; 
meanP=mean(P); 
  
% Deterministic approach 
PRS1det=PeqRS1det+PmRS1det-(PeqRS1det*PmRS1det); 
PRS2det=PeqRS2det+PmRS2det-(PeqRS2det*PmRS2det); 
PRS3det=PeqRS3det+PmRS3det-(PeqRS3det*PmRS3det); 
PRSdet=[PRS1det PRS2det PRS3det]; 
  
[counts1,centers1] = hist(PRS1,20); 
[counts2,centers2] = hist(PRS2,20); 
[counts3,centers3] = hist(PRS3,20); 
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y1=linspace(0,(max(counts1/rand)+0.05),100); 
y2=linspace(0,(max(counts2/rand)+0.05),100); 
y3=linspace(0,(max(counts3/rand)+0.05),100); 
  
figure (5) 
  
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centers1,(counts1/rand),'g') 
title ('Probability of top-event') 
hold on  
plot (meanP(1),y1,'b') 
hold on 
plot (PRSdet(1),y1,'k') 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centers2,(counts2/rand),'y') 
hold on  
plot (meanP(2),y2,'b') 
hold on 
plot (PRSdet(2),y2,'k') 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centers3,(counts3/rand),'r') 
hold on  
plot (meanP(3),y3,'b') 
hold on 
plot (PRSdet(3),y3,'k') 
hold off 
C. Pressurized tank in Priolo (SR) 
clear all 
close all 
  
rand=input('number of iterations') 
 
% Earthquakes 
 
% Seismic Matrix 
R=xlsread('DistribuzioniPriolo.xlsx', 'distanza', 'A1:A9'); 
M=xlsread('DistribuzioniPriolo.xlsx', 'Magnitudo', 'A1:I1'); 
MP=xlsread('DistribuzioniPriolo.xlsx', 'Matrice', 'A1:I9'); 
F=xlsread('DistribuzioniPriolo.xlsx', 'Frequenza', 'A1:I1'); 
  
r=length(R); 
m=length(M); 
logPGA=[]; 
for i=1:r 
    for j=1:m 
        logPGA(i,j)=-3.37+(1.93-0.203*M(j)).*M(j)+(-
3.02+0.00744*M(j)^3)*log10(sqrt(R(i)^2+7.3^2)); 
    end 
end 
  
sigmashell=0.358; % % Shape value of LogPGA 
mu1shell=0.83; %Mean value of Fragility Small hole 
Matlab Codes  87 
 
sigma1shell=0.99;  %shape value of Fragility Small hole 
mu2shell=1.85; % Mean value of Fragility Medium hole 
sigma2shell=0.85; % shape value of Fragility Medium hole 
mu3shell=4.91; % Mean value of Fragility large hole 
sigma3shell=0.84;  % Shape value of Fragility large hole 
PeqRS1shell=[]; 
PeqRS2shell=[]; 
PeqRS3shell=[]; 
PeqRS1shell=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS2shell=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS3shell=zeros(rand,1); 
  
for i=1:rand 
    PGA1shell=random ('norm',logPGA,sigmashell); 
    PGAshell=(10.^PGA1shell).*9.81; 
    RS1eqshell= cdf('logn',PGAshell,mu1shell,sigma1shell); 
    RS3eqshell= cdf('logn',PGAshell,mu3shell,sigma3shell); 
    RS2eqshell= cdf('logn',PGAshell,mu2shell,sigma2shell); 
    Prs1shell=(1-RS1eqshell).*(MP./100); 
    Prs2shell=(RS2eqshell-RS3eqshell).*(MP./100); 
    Prs3shell=RS3eqshell.*(MP./100); 
    PfRS11shell=sum(Prs1shell).*F; 
    PfRS1shell=sum(PfRS11shell(:)); 
    PfRS22shell=sum(Prs2shell).*F; 
    PfRS2shell=sum(PfRS22shell(:)); 
    PfRS33shell=sum(Prs3shell).*F; 
    PfRS3shell=sum(PfRS33shell(:)); 
    PeqRS1shell(i)=[PfRS1shell ]; 
    PeqRS2shell(i)=[PfRS2shell ]; 
    PeqRS3shell(i)=[PfRS3shell ]; 
    i=i+1; 
end 
  
PeqRSshell =[PeqRS1shell PeqRS2shell PeqRS3shell]; 
meaneqshell=mean(PeqRSshell); 
  
% Deterministic approach 
PGAdetshell=(10.^logPGA).*9.81; 
RS3eqdetshell= cdf('logn',PGAdetshell,mu3shell,sigma3shell); 
RS2eqdetshell=cdf('logn',PGAdetshell,mu2shell,sigma2shell); 
Prs1detshell=(1-RS2eqdetshell).*(MP./100); 
Prs2detshell=(RS2eqdetshell-RS3eqdetshell).*(MP./100); 
Prs3detshell=RS3eqdetshell.*(MP./100); 
PfRS11detshell= sum(Prs1detshell).*F; 
PfRS1detshell=sum(PfRS11detshell(:)); 
PfRS22detshell= sum(Prs2detshell).*F; 
PfRS2detshell=sum(PfRS22detshell(:)); 
PfRS33detshell= sum(Prs3detshell).*F; 
PfRS3detshell=sum(PfRS33detshell(:)); 
PeqRSdetshell =[PfRS1detshell PfRS2detshell PfRS3detshell]; 
  
[countsa,centersa] = hist(PeqRS1shell,20); 
[countsb,centersb] = hist(PeqRS2shell,20); 
[countsc,centersc] = hist(PeqRS3shell,20); 
[countspga,centerspga] = hist(PGA1shell,20); 
  
ya=linspace(0,(max(countsa/rand)+0.05)); 
yb=linspace(0,(max(countsb/rand)+0.05)); 
yc=linspace(0,(max(countsc/rand)+0.05)); 
  
figure (2) 
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subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersa,(countsa/rand),'g'); 
title ('Shell Failure Probability') 
hold on 
plot (meaneqshell(1),ya,'b',PeqRSdetshell(1),ya,'k'); 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centersb,(countsb/rand),'y') 
hold on  
plot (meaneqshell(2),yb,'b',PeqRSdetshell(2),yb,'k') 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centersc,(countsc/rand),'r') 
hold on  
plot (meaneqshell(3),yc,'b',PeqRSdetshell(3),yc,'k') 
hold off 
 
% Pipes 
 
sigma=0.358; % % Shape value of LogPGA 
mu2=0.4522; % Mean value of Fragility Medium hole 
sigma2=0.39; % shape value of Fragility Medium hole 
mu3=0.7116; % Mean value of Fragility large hole 
sigma3=0.20;  % Shape value of Fragility large hole 
PeqRS1pipe=[]; 
PeqRS2pipe=[]; 
PeqRS3pipe=[]; 
PeqRS1pipe=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS2pipe=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS3pipe=zeros(rand,1); 
  
for i=1:rand 
    PGA1pipe=random ('norm',logPGA,sigma); 
    PGApipe=(10.^PGA1pipe).*9.81; 
    RS3eqpipe= cdf('logn',PGApipe,mu3,sigma3); 
    RS2eqpipe=cdf('logn',PGApipe,mu2,sigma2); 
    Prs1pipe=(1-RS2eqpipe).*(MP./100); 
    Prs2pipe=(RS2eqpipe-RS3eqpipe).*(MP./100); 
    Prs3pipe=RS3eqpipe.*(MP./100); 
    PfRS11pipe=sum(Prs1pipe).*F; 
    PfRS1pipe=sum(PfRS11pipe(:)); 
    PfRS22pipe=sum(Prs2pipe).*F; 
    PfRS2pipe=sum(PfRS22pipe(:)); 
    PfRS33pipe=sum(Prs3pipe).*F; 
    PfRS3pipe=sum(PfRS33pipe(:)); 
    PeqRS1pipe(i)=[PfRS1pipe ]; 
    PeqRS2pipe(i)=[PfRS2pipe ]; 
    PeqRS3pipe(i)=[PfRS3pipe ]; 
    i=i+1; 
end 
  
PeqRSpipe =[PeqRS1pipe PeqRS2pipe PeqRS3pipe]; 
meaneqpipe=mean(PeqRSpipe); 
  
% Deterministic approach 
PGAdetpipe=(10.^logPGA).*9.81; 
RS3eqdetpipe= cdf('logn',PGAdetpipe,mu3,sigma3); 
RS2eqdetpipe=cdf('logn',PGAdetpipe,mu2,sigma2); 
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Prs1detpipe=(1-RS2eqdetpipe).*(MP./100); 
Prs2detpipe=RS3eqdetpipe.*(MP./100); 
Prs3detpipe=Prs2detpipe; 
PfRS11detpipe= sum(Prs1detpipe).*F; 
PfRS1detpipe=sum(PfRS11detpipe(:)); 
PfRS22detpipe= sum(Prs2detpipe).*F; 
PfRS2detpipe=sum(PfRS22detpipe(:)); 
PfRS33detpipe= sum(Prs3detpipe).*F; 
PfRS3detpipe=sum(PfRS33detpipe(:)); 
PeqRSdetpipe =[PfRS1detpipe PfRS2detpipe PfRS3detpipe]; 
  
[countsa,centersa] = hist(PeqRS1pipe,20); 
[countsb,centersb] = hist(PeqRS2pipe,20); 
[countsc,centersc] = hist(PeqRS3pipe,20); 
[countspga,centerspga] = hist(PGA1pipe,20); 
  
ya=linspace(0,(max(countsa/rand)+0.05)); 
yb=linspace(0,(max(countsb/rand)+0.05)); 
yc=linspace(0,(max(countsc/rand)+0.05)); 
  
figure (3) 
 
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersa,(countsa/rand),'g'); 
title ('Pipe Failure Probability') 
hold on 
plot (meaneqpipe(1),ya,'b',PeqRSdetpipe(1),ya,'k'); 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centersb,(countsb/rand),'y') 
hold on  
plot (meaneqpipe(2),yb,'b',PeqRSdetpipe(2),yb,'k') 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centersc,(countsc/rand),'r') 
hold on  
plot (meaneqpipe(3),yc,'b',PeqRSdetpipe(3),yc,'k') 
hold off 
 
% Sum seismic risk 
 
%Probabilistic 
PeqRS1= PeqRS1shell+PeqRS1pipe-(PeqRS1shell.*PeqRS1pipe); 
PeqRS2= PeqRS2shell+PeqRS2pipe-(PeqRS2shell.*PeqRS2pipe); 
PeqRS3= PeqRS3shell+PeqRS3pipe-(PeqRS3shell.*PeqRS3pipe); 
  
PeqRS =[PeqRS1 PeqRS2 PeqRS3]; 
meaneq=mean(PeqRS); 
  
%Deterministic 
PeqRS1det= PfRS1detshell+PfRS1detpipe-(PfRS1detshell.*PfRS1detpipe); 
PeqRS2det= PfRS2detshell+PfRS2detpipe-(PfRS2detshell.*PfRS2detpipe); 
PeqRS3det= PfRS3detshell+PfRS3detpipe-(PfRS3detshell.*PfRS3detpipe); 
PeqRSdet =[PeqRS1det PeqRS2det PeqRS3det]; 
  
[countsa,centersa] = hist(PeqRS1,20); 
[countsb,centersb] = hist(PeqRS2,20); 
[countsc,centersc] = hist(PeqRS3,20); 
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[countspga,centerspga] = hist(PGA1pipe,20); 
  
ya=linspace(0,(max(countsa/rand)+0.05)); 
yb=linspace(0,(max(countsb/rand)+0.05)); 
yc=linspace(0,(max(countsc/rand)+0.05)); 
  
figure (4) 
 
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersa,(countsa/rand),'g'); 
title ('Seismic Failure Probability') 
hold on 
plot (meaneq(1),ya,'b',PeqRSdet(1),ya,'k'); 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centersb,(countsb/rand),'y') 
hold on  
plot (meaneq(2),yb,'b',PeqRSdet(2),yb,'k') 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centersc,(countsc/rand),'r') 
hold on  
plot (meaneq(3),yc,'b',PeqRSdet(3),yc,'k') 
hold off 
 
%Mechanical failure probability 
 
mmec= [0.000000048 0.0000001 0.00000021]; %event/years 
LBmec=[0.00000002 0.000000024 0.000000038]; %event/years 
UBmec=[0.000000112 0.00000041 0.00000053]; %event/years 
 
efmec=sqrt(UBmec./LBmec); 
  
sigmec=log(efmec)/1.645; 
vmec=(mmec.^2).*(exp(sigmec.^2)-1); 
sigmamec=sigmec; 
mumec = log((mmec.^2)./sqrt(vmec+mmec.^2)); 
  
T=50; 
X=[]; 
for i=1:rand 
    for j=1:length(mmec) 
        X(i,j)=random ('logn',mumec(j),sigmamec(j)); 
          if (X(j)<=UBmec(j) && X(j)>=LBmec(j)) 
            X(i,j)=X(i,j); 
          else 
              if (X(j)<UBmec(j)) 
                  X(i,j)=UBmec(j); 
              end 
              if (X(j)>LBmec(j)) 
                  X(i,j)=LBmec(j); 
              end 
          end 
          P1mec(i,j) = X(i,j); 
          RS1mec(i,j) = P1mec(i,j).*0.84; 
          RS2mec(i,j) = P1mec(i,j).*0.08; 
          RS3mec(i,j) = P1mec(i,j).*0.08; 
    end 
end 
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PmRS1mec=sum(RS1mec,2)-(RS1mec(:,1).*RS1mec(:,2))-
(RS1mec(:,1).*RS1mec(:,3))-(RS1mec(:,3).*RS1mec(:,2)); 
PmRS2mec=sum(RS2mec,2)-(RS2mec(:,1).*RS2mec(:,2))-
(RS2mec(:,1).*RS2mec(:,3))-(RS2mec(:,3).*RS2mec(:,2)); 
PmRS3mec=sum(RS3mec,2)-(RS3mec(:,1).*RS3mec(:,2))-
(RS3mec(:,1).*RS3mec(:,3))-(RS3mec(:,3).*RS3mec(:,2)); 
  
PmRSmec =[PmRS1mec PmRS2mec PmRS3mec]; 
meanmmec=mean(PmRSmec); 
  
% deterministic approach 
  
P1detmec = mmec; 
RS1detmec = P1detmec.*0.84; 
RS2detmec = P1detmec.*0.08; 
RS3detmec = P1detmec.*0.08; 
PmRS1detmec=sum(RS1detmec)-(RS1detmec(:,1).*RS1detmec(:,2))-
(RS1detmec(:,1).*RS1detmec(:,3))-(RS1detmec(:,3).*RS1detmec(:,2)); 
PmRS2detmec=sum(RS2detmec,2)-(RS2detmec(:,1).*RS2detmec(:,2))-
(RS2detmec(:,1).*RS2detmec(:,3))-(RS2detmec(:,3).*RS2detmec(:,2)); 
PmRS3detmec=sum(RS3detmec,2)-(RS3detmec(:,1).*RS3detmec(:,2))-
(RS3detmec(:,1).*RS3detmec(:,3))-(RS3detmec(:,3).*RS3detmec(:,2)); 
  
PmRSdetmec =[PmRS1detmec PmRS2detmec PmRS3detmec]; 
  
[countsd,centersd] = hist(PmRS1mec,20); 
[countse,centerse] = hist(PmRS2mec,20); 
[countsf,centersf] = hist(PmRS3mec,20); 
  
yd=linspace(0,(max(countsd/rand)+0.05),100); 
ye=linspace(0,(max(countse/rand)+0.05),100); 
yf=linspace(0,(max(countsf/rand)+0.05),100); 
  
figure (5) 
  
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersd,(countsd/rand),'g'); 
title ('Mechanical Failure Probability of Pipes and Valves') 
hold on 
plot (meanmmec(1),yd,'b'); 
hold on 
plot (PmRSdetmec(1),yd,'k'); 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centerse,(countse/rand),'y') 
hold on  
plot (meanmmec(2),ye,'b') 
hold on 
plot (PmRSdetmec(2),ye,'k') 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centersf,(countsf/rand),'r') 
hold on  
plot (meanmmec(3),yf,'b') 
hold on 
plot (PmRSdetmec(3),yf,'k') 
hold off 
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%Pressure shell 
 
mshell= [0.000081 0.000052 0.0000097]; %event/years 
LBshell=[0.000046 0.000025 0.0000014]; %event/years 
UBshell=[0.00013 0.000095 0.000036]; %event/years 
  
efshell=sqrt(UBshell./LBshell); 
  
sigshell=log(efshell)/1.645; 
vshell=(mshell.^2).*(exp(sigshell.^2)-1); 
sigmashell=sigshell; 
mushell = log((mshell.^2)./sqrt(vshell+mshell.^2)); 
  
T=50; 
X=[]; 
for i=1:rand 
    for j=1:length(mshell) 
        X(i,j)=random ('logn',mushell(j),sigmashell(j)); 
    end 
end 
PmRS1shell=P1shell(:,1); 
PmRS2shell=P1shell(:,2); 
PmRS3shell=P1shell(:,3); 
  
PmRSshell =[PmRS1shell PmRS2shell PmRS3shell]; 
meanmshell=mean(PmRSshell); 
  
% Deterministic approach 
P1detshell = mshell; 
PmRS1detshell=P1detshell(1,1); 
PmRS2detshell=P1detshell(1,2); 
PmRS3detshell=P1detshell(1,3); 
  
PmRSdetshell =[PmRS1detshell PmRS2detshell PmRS3detshell]; 
  
[countsd,centersd] = hist(PmRS1shell,20); 
[countse,centerse] = hist(PmRS2shell,20); 
[countsf,centersf] = hist(PmRS3shell,20); 
  
yd=linspace(0,(max(countsd/rand)+0.05),100); 
ye=linspace(0,(max(countse/rand)+0.05),100); 
yf=linspace(0,(max(countsf/rand)+0.05),100); 
  
figure (6) 
  
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersd,(countsd/rand),'g'); 
title ('Mechanical Failure Shell') 
hold on 
plot (meanmshell(:,1),yd,'b'); 
hold on 
plot (PmRSdetshell(1),yd,'k'); 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centerse,(countse/rand),'y') 
hold on  
plot (meanmshell(:,2),ye,'b') 
hold on 
plot (PmRSdetshell(2),ye,'k') 
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hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centersf,(countsf/rand),'r') 
hold on  
plot (meanmshell(:,3),yf,'b') 
hold on 
plot (PmRSdetshell(3),yf,'k') 
hold off 
 
%Summation 
 
PmRS1=PmRSmec(:,1)+PmRSshell(1,1)-(PmRSmec(:,1).*PmRSshell(1,1)); 
PmRS2=PmRSmec(:,2)+PmRSshell(1,2)-(PmRSmec(:,2).*PmRSshell(1,2)); 
PmRS3=PmRSmec(:,3)+PmRSshell(1,3)-(PmRSmec(:,3).*PmRSshell(1,3)); 
PmRS= [PmRS1 PmRS2 PmRS3]; 
meanm=mean(PmRS); 
  
PmRSdet=PmRSdetmec+PmRSdetshell-(PmRSdetmec.*PmRSdetshell); 
PmRS1det=PmRSdet(:,1); 
PmRS2det=PmRSdet(:,2); 
PmRS3det=PmRSdet(:,3); 
  
[countsd,centersd] = hist(PmRS1,20); 
[countse,centerse] = hist(PmRS2,20); 
[countsf,centersf] = hist(PmRS3,20); 
  
yd=linspace(0,(max(countsd/rand)+0.05),100); 
ye=linspace(0,(max(countse/rand)+0.05),100); 
yf=linspace(0,(max(countsf/rand)+0.05),100); 
  
figure (7) 
  
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersd,(countsd/rand),'g'); 
title ('Failure Probability due to Mechanical Components') 
hold on 
plot (meanm(1),yd,'b'); 
hold on 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centerse,(countse/rand),'y') 
hold on  
plot (meanm(2),ye,'b') 
hold on 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centersf,(countsf/rand),'r') 
hold on  
plot (meanm(3),yf,'b') 
hold on 
hold off 
 
% Probability of release from pressurized tank 
 
PRS1=PeqRS1+PmRS1-(PeqRS1.*PmRS1); 
PRS2=PeqRS2+PmRS2-(PeqRS2.*PmRS2); 
PRS3=PeqRS3+PmRS3-(PeqRS3.*PmRS3); 
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P=[PRS1 PRS2 PRS3]; 
meanP=mean(P); 
  
% Deterministic approach 
PRS1det=PeqRS1det+PmRS1det-(PeqRS1det*PmRS1det); 
PRS2det=PeqRS2det+PmRS2det-(PeqRS2det*PmRS2det); 
PRS3det=PeqRS3det+PmRS3det-(PeqRS3det*PmRS3det); 
PRSdet=[PRS1det PRS2det PRS3det]; 
  
[counts1,centers1] = hist(PRS1,20); 
[counts2,centers2] = hist(PRS2,20); 
[counts3,centers3] = hist(PRS3,20); 
  
y1=linspace(0,(max(counts1/rand)+0.05),100); 
y2=linspace(0,(max(counts2/rand)+0.05),100); 
y3=linspace(0,(max(counts3/rand)+0.05),100); 
  
figure (8) 
  
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centers1,(counts1/rand),'g') 
title ('Probability of top-event') 
hold on  
plot (meanP(1),y1,'b') 
hold on 
plot (PRSdet(1),y1,'k') 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centers2,(counts2/rand),'y') 
hold on  
plot (meanP(2),y2,'b') 
hold on 
plot (PRSdet(2),y2,'k') 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centers3,(counts3/rand),'r') 
hold on  
plot (meanP(3),y3,'b') 
hold on 
plot (PRSdet(3),y3,'k') 
hold off 
D. Pressurized tank in Falconara Marittima (AN) 
clear all 
close all 
  
rand=input('number of iterations') 
  
  
% seismic Matrix 
R=xlsread('DistribuzioniFalconara.xlsx', 'distanza', 'A1:A11'); 
M=xlsread('DistribuzioniFalconara.xlsx', 'Magnitudo', 'A1:H1'); 
MP=xlsread('DistribuzioniFalconara.xlsx', 'Matrice', 'A1:H11'); 
F=xlsread('DistribuzioniFalconara.xlsx', 'Frequenza', 'A1:H1'); 
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r=length(R); 
m=length(M); 
logPGA=[]; 
for i=1:r 
    for j=1:m 
        logPGA(i,j)=-3.37+(1.93-0.203*M(j)).*M(j)+(-
3.02+0.00744*M(j)^3)*log10(sqrt(R(i)^2+7.3^2)); 
    end 
end 
  
sigmashell=0.358; % % Shape value of LogPGA 
mu1shell=0.83; %Mean value of Fragility Small hole 
sigma1shell=0.99;  %shape value of Fragility Small hole 
mu2shell=1.85; % Mean value of Fragility Medium hole 
sigma2shell=0.85; % shape value of Fragility Medium hole 
mu3shell=4.91; % Mean value of Fragility large hole 
sigma3shell=0.84;  % Shape value of Fragility large hole 
PeqRS1shell=[]; 
PeqRS2shell=[]; 
PeqRS3shell=[]; 
PeqRS1shell=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS2shell=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS3shell=zeros(rand,1); 
  
for i=1:rand 
    PGA1shell=random ('norm',logPGA,sigmashell); 
    PGAshell=(10.^PGA1shell).*9.81; 
    RS1eqshell= cdf('logn',PGAshell,mu1shell,sigma1shell); 
    RS3eqshell= cdf('logn',PGAshell,mu3shell,sigma3shell); 
    RS2eqshell= cdf('logn',PGAshell,mu2shell,sigma2shell); 
    Prs1shell=(1-RS1eqshell).*(MP./100); 
    Prs2shell=(1-RS2eqshell).*(MP./100); 
    Prs3shell=RS3eqshell.*(MP./100); 
    PfRS11shell=sum(Prs1shell).*F; 
    PfRS1shell=sum(PfRS11shell(:)); 
    PfRS22shell=sum(Prs2shell).*F; 
    PfRS2shell=sum(PfRS22shell(:)); 
    PfRS33shell=sum(Prs3shell).*F; 
    PfRS3shell=sum(PfRS33shell(:)); 
    PeqRS1shell(i)=[PfRS1shell ]; 
    PeqRS2shell(i)=[PfRS2shell ]; 
    PeqRS3shell(i)=[PfRS3shell ]; 
    i=i+1; 
end 
  
PeqRSshell =[PeqRS1shell PeqRS2shell PeqRS3shell]; 
meaneqshell=mean(PeqRSshell); 
  
% Deterministic approach 
PGAdetshell=(10.^logPGA).*9.81; 
RS3eqdetshell= cdf('logn',PGAdetshell,mu3shell,sigma3shell); 
RS2eqdetshell=cdf('logn',PGAdetshell,mu2shell,sigma2shell); 
Prs1detshell=(1-RS2eqdetshell).*(MP./100); 
Prs2detshell=(RS2eqdetshell-RS3eqdetshell).*(MP./100); 
Prs3detshell=RS3eqdetshell.*(MP./100); 
PfRS11detshell= sum(Prs1detshell).*F; 
PfRS1detshell=sum(PfRS11detshell(:)); 
PfRS22detshell= sum(Prs2detshell).*F; 
PfRS2detshell=sum(PfRS22detshell(:)); 
PfRS33detshell= sum(Prs3detshell).*F; 
PfRS3detshell=sum(PfRS33detshell(:)); 
PeqRSdetshell =[PfRS1detshell PfRS2detshell PfRS3detshell]; 
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[countsa,centersa] = hist(PeqRS1shell,20); 
[countsb,centersb] = hist(PeqRS2shell,20); 
[countsc,centersc] = hist(PeqRS3shell,20); 
[countspga,centerspga] = hist(PGA1shell,20); 
  
ya=linspace(0,(max(countsa/rand)+0.05)); 
yb=linspace(0,(max(countsb/rand)+0.05)); 
yc=linspace(0,(max(countsc/rand)+0.05)); 
 
figure (2) 
 
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersa,(countsa/rand),'g'); 
title ('Shell Failure Probability') 
hold on 
plot (meaneqshell(1),ya,'b',PeqRSdetshell(1),ya,'k'); 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centersb,(countsb/rand),'y') 
hold on  
plot (meaneqshell(2),yb,'b',PeqRSdetshell(2),yb,'k') 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centersc,(countsc/rand),'r') 
hold on  
plot (meaneqshell(3),yc,'b',PeqRSdetshell(3),yc,'k') 
hold off 
 
% Pipes 
 
sigma=0.358; % % Shape value of LogPGA 
mu2=0.4522; % Mean value of Fragility Medium hole 
sigma2=0.39; % shape value of Fragility Medium hole 
mu3=0.7116; % Mean value of Fragility large hole 
sigma3=0.20;  % Shape value of Fragility large hole 
PeqRS1pipe=[]; 
PeqRS2pipe=[]; 
PeqRS3pipe=[]; 
PeqRS1pipe=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS2pipe=zeros(rand,1); 
PeqRS3pipe=zeros(rand,1); 
  
for i=1:rand 
    PGA1pipe=random ('norm',logPGA,sigma); 
    PGApipe=(10.^PGA1pipe).*9.81; 
    RS3eqpipe= cdf('logn',PGApipe,mu3,sigma3); 
    RS2eqpipe=cdf('logn',PGApipe,mu2,sigma2); 
    Prs1pipe=(1-RS2eqpipe).*(MP./100); 
    Prs2pipe=(RS2eqpipe-RS3eqpipe).*(MP./100); 
    Prs3pipe=RS3eqpipe.*(MP./100); 
    PfRS11pipe=sum(Prs1pipe).*F; 
    PfRS1pipe=sum(PfRS11pipe(:)); 
    PfRS22pipe=sum(Prs2pipe).*F; 
    PfRS2pipe=sum(PfRS22pipe(:)); 
    PfRS33pipe=sum(Prs3pipe).*F; 
    PfRS3pipe=sum(PfRS33pipe(:)); 
    PeqRS1pipe(i)=[PfRS1pipe ]; 
    PeqRS2pipe(i)=[PfRS2pipe ]; 
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    PeqRS3pipe(i)=[PfRS3pipe ]; 
    i=i+1; 
end 
  
PeqRSpipe =[PeqRS1pipe PeqRS2pipe PeqRS3pipe]; 
meaneqpipe=mean(PeqRSpipe); 
  
% Deterministic approach 
PGAdetpipe=(10.^logPGA).*9.81; 
RS3eqdetpipe= cdf('logn',PGAdetpipe,mu3,sigma3); 
RS2eqdetpipe=cdf('logn',PGAdetpipe,mu2,sigma2); 
Prs1detpipe=(1-RS2eqdetpipe).*(MP./100); 
Prs2detpipe=RS3eqdetpipe.*(MP./100); 
Prs3detpipe=Prs2detpipe; 
PfRS11detpipe= sum(Prs1detpipe).*F; 
PfRS1detpipe=sum(PfRS11detpipe(:)); 
PfRS22detpipe= sum(Prs2detpipe).*F; 
PfRS2detpipe=sum(PfRS22detpipe(:)); 
PfRS33detpipe= sum(Prs3detpipe).*F; 
PfRS3detpipe=sum(PfRS33detpipe(:)); 
PeqRSdetpipe =[PfRS1detpipe PfRS2detpipe PfRS3detpipe]; 
  
[countsa,centersa] = hist(PeqRS1pipe,20); 
[countsb,centersb] = hist(PeqRS2pipe,20); 
[countsc,centersc] = hist(PeqRS3pipe,20); 
[countspga,centerspga] = hist(PGA1pipe,20); 
  
ya=linspace(0,(max(countsa/rand)+0.05)); 
yb=linspace(0,(max(countsb/rand)+0.05)); 
yc=linspace(0,(max(countsc/rand)+0.05)); 
  
figure (3) 
 
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersa,(countsa/rand),'g'); 
title ('Pipe Failure Probability') 
hold on 
plot (meaneqpipe(1),ya,'b',PeqRSdetpipe(1),ya,'k'); 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centersb,(countsb/rand),'y') 
hold on  
plot (meaneqpipe(2),yb,'b',PeqRSdetpipe(2),yb,'k') 
hold off 
  
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centersc,(countsc/rand),'r') 
hold on  
plot (meaneqpipe(3),yc,'b',PeqRSdetpipe(3),yc,'k') 
hold off 
 
% Sum seismic risk 
 
%Probabilistic 
PeqRS1= PeqRS1shell+PeqRS1pipe-(PeqRS1shell.*PeqRS1pipe); 
PeqRS2= PeqRS2shell+PeqRS2pipe-(PeqRS2shell.*PeqRS2pipe); 
PeqRS3= PeqRS3shell+PeqRS3pipe-(PeqRS3shell.*PeqRS3pipe); 
  
PeqRS =[PeqRS1 PeqRS2 PeqRS3]; 
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meaneq=mean(PeqRS); 
  
%Deterministic 
PeqRS1det= PfRS1detshell+PfRS1detpipe-(PfRS1detshell.*PfRS1detpipe); 
PeqRS2det= PfRS2detshell+PfRS2detpipe-(PfRS2detshell.*PfRS2detpipe); 
PeqRS3det= PfRS3detshell+PfRS3detpipe-(PfRS3detshell.*PfRS3detpipe); 
PeqRSdet =[PeqRS1det PeqRS2det PeqRS3det]; 
  
[countsa,centersa] = hist(PeqRS1,20); 
[countsb,centersb] = hist(PeqRS2,20); 
[countsc,centersc] = hist(PeqRS3,20); 
[countspga,centerspga] = hist(PGA1pipe,20); 
  
ya=linspace(0,(max(countsa/rand)+0.05)); 
yb=linspace(0,(max(countsb/rand)+0.05)); 
yc=linspace(0,(max(countsc/rand)+0.05)); 
  
  
figure (4) 
 
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersa,(countsa/rand),'g'); 
title ('Seismic Failure Probability') 
hold on 
plot (meaneq(1),ya,'b',PeqRSdet(1),ya,'k'); 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centersb,(countsb/rand),'y') 
hold on  
plot (meaneq(2),yb,'b',PeqRSdet(2),yb,'k') 
hold off 
  
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centersc,(countsc/rand),'r') 
hold on  
plot (meaneq(3),yc,'b',PeqRSdet(3),yc,'k') 
hold off 
 
%Mechanical failure probability 
 
mmec= [0.000000048 0.0000001 0.00000021]; %event/years 
LBmec=[0.00000002 0.000000024 0.000000038]; %event/years 
UBmec=[0.000000112 0.00000041 0.00000053]; %event/years 
 
efmec=sqrt(UBmec./LBmec); 
  
sigmec=log(efmec)/1.645; 
vmec=(mmec.^2).*(exp(sigmec.^2)-1); 
sigmamec=sigmec; 
mumec = log((mmec.^2)./sqrt(vmec+mmec.^2)); 
  
T=50; 
X=[]; 
for i=1:rand 
    for j=1:length(mmec) 
        X(i,j)=random ('logn',mumec(j),sigmamec(j)); 
          if (X(j)<=UBmec(j) && X(j)>=LBmec(j)) 
            X(i,j)=X(i,j); 
          else 
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              if (X(j)<UBmec(j)) 
                  X(i,j)=UBmec(j); 
              end 
              if (X(j)>LBmec(j)) 
                  X(i,j)=LBmec(j); 
              end 
          end 
          P1mec(i,j) = X(i,j); 
          RS1mec(i,j) = P1mec(i,j).*0.84; 
          RS2mec(i,j) = P1mec(i,j).*0.08; 
          RS3mec(i,j) = P1mec(i,j).*0.08; 
    end 
end 
PmRS1mec=sum(RS1mec,2)-(RS1mec(:,1).*RS1mec(:,2))-
(RS1mec(:,1).*RS1mec(:,3))-(RS1mec(:,3).*RS1mec(:,2)); 
PmRS2mec=sum(RS2mec,2)-(RS2mec(:,1).*RS2mec(:,2))-
(RS2mec(:,1).*RS2mec(:,3))-(RS2mec(:,3).*RS2mec(:,2)); 
PmRS3mec=sum(RS3mec,2)-(RS3mec(:,1).*RS3mec(:,2))-
(RS3mec(:,1).*RS3mec(:,3))-(RS3mec(:,3).*RS3mec(:,2)); 
  
PmRSmec =[PmRS1mec PmRS2mec PmRS3mec]; 
meanmmec=mean(PmRSmec); 
  
% Deterministic approach 
P1detmec = mmec; 
RS1detmec = P1detmec.*0.84; 
RS2detmec = P1detmec.*0.08; 
RS3detmec = P1detmec.*0.08; 
PmRS1detmec=sum(RS1detmec)-(RS1detmec(:,1).*RS1detmec(:,2))-
(RS1detmec(:,1).*RS1detmec(:,3))-(RS1detmec(:,3).*RS1detmec(:,2)); 
PmRS2detmec=sum(RS2detmec,2)-(RS2detmec(:,1).*RS2detmec(:,2))-
(RS2detmec(:,1).*RS2detmec(:,3))-(RS2detmec(:,3).*RS2detmec(:,2)); 
PmRS3detmec=sum(RS3detmec,2)-(RS3detmec(:,1).*RS3detmec(:,2))-
(RS3detmec(:,1).*RS3detmec(:,3))-(RS3detmec(:,3).*RS3detmec(:,2)); 
  
PmRSdetmec =[PmRS1detmec PmRS2detmec PmRS3detmec]; 
  
[countsd,centersd] = hist(PmRS1mec,20); 
[countse,centerse] = hist(PmRS2mec,20); 
[countsf,centersf] = hist(PmRS3mec,20); 
  
yd=linspace(0,(max(countsd/rand)+0.05),100); 
ye=linspace(0,(max(countse/rand)+0.05),100); 
yf=linspace(0,(max(countsf/rand)+0.05),100); 
  
figure (5) 
  
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersd,(countsd/rand),'g'); 
title ('Mechanical Failure Probability of Pipes and Valves') 
hold on 
plot (meanmmec(1),yd,'b'); 
hold on 
plot (PmRSdetmec(1),yd,'k'); 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centerse,(countse/rand),'y') 
hold on  
plot (meanmmec(2),ye,'b') 
hold on 
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plot (PmRSdetmec(2),ye,'k') 
hold off 
  
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centersf,(countsf/rand),'r') 
hold on  
plot (meanmmec(3),yf,'b') 
hold on 
plot (PmRSdetmec(3),yf,'k') 
hold off 
 
%Pressure shell 
 
mshell= [0.000081 0.000052 0.0000097]; %event/years 
LBshell=[0.000046 0.000025 0.0000014]; %event/years 
UBshell=[0.00013 0.000095 0.000036]; %event/years 
  
efshell=sqrt(UBshell./LBshell); 
  
sigshell=log(efshell)/1.645; 
vshell=(mshell.^2).*(exp(sigshell.^2)-1); 
sigmashell=sigshell; 
mushell = log((mshell.^2)./sqrt(vshell+mshell.^2)); 
  
T=50; 
X=[]; 
for i=1:rand 
    for j=1:length(mshell) 
        X(i,j)=random ('logn',mushell(j),sigmashell(j)); 
    end 
end 
PmRS1shell=P1shell(:,1); 
PmRS2shell=P1shell(:,2); 
PmRS3shell=P1shell(:,3); 
  
PmRSshell =[PmRS1shell PmRS2shell PmRS3shell]; 
meanmshell=mean(PmRSshell); 
  
% Deterministic approach 
P1detshell = mshell; 
PmRS1detshell=P1detshell(1,1); 
PmRS2detshell=P1detshell(1,2); 
PmRS3detshell=P1detshell(1,3); 
  
PmRSdetshell =[PmRS1detshell PmRS2detshell PmRS3detshell]; 
  
[countsd,centersd] = hist(PmRS1shell,20); 
[countse,centerse] = hist(PmRS2shell,20); 
[countsf,centersf] = hist(PmRS3shell,20); 
  
yd=linspace(0,(max(countsd/rand)+0.05),100); 
ye=linspace(0,(max(countse/rand)+0.05),100); 
yf=linspace(0,(max(countsf/rand)+0.05),100); 
  
figure (6) 
  
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersd,(countsd/rand),'g'); 
title ('Mechanical Failure Shell') 
hold on 
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plot (meanmshell(:,1),yd,'b'); 
hold on 
plot (PmRSdetshell(1),yd,'k'); 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centerse,(countse/rand),'y') 
hold on  
plot (meanmshell(:,2),ye,'b') 
hold on 
plot (PmRSdetshell(2),ye,'k') 
hold off 
  
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centersf,(countsf/rand),'r') 
hold on  
plot (meanmshell(:,3),yf,'b') 
hold on 
plot (PmRSdetshell(3),yf,'k') 
hold off 
 
%Summation 
 
PmRS1=PmRSmec(:,1)+PmRSshell(1,1)-(PmRSmec(:,1).*PmRSshell(1,1)); 
PmRS2=PmRSmec(:,2)+PmRSshell(1,2)-(PmRSmec(:,2).*PmRSshell(1,2)); 
PmRS3=PmRSmec(:,3)+PmRSshell(1,3)-(PmRSmec(:,3).*PmRSshell(1,3)); 
PmRS= [PmRS1 PmRS2 PmRS3]; 
meanm=mean(PmRS); 
  
PmRSdet=PmRSdetmec+PmRSdetshell-(PmRSdetmec.*PmRSdetshell); 
PmRS1det=PmRSdet(:,1); 
PmRS2det=PmRSdet(:,2); 
PmRS3det=PmRSdet(:,3); 
  
[countsd,centersd] = hist(PmRS1,20); 
[countse,centerse] = hist(PmRS2,20); 
[countsf,centersf] = hist(PmRS3,20); 
  
yd=linspace(0,(max(countsd/rand)+0.05),100); 
ye=linspace(0,(max(countse/rand)+0.05),100); 
yf=linspace(0,(max(countsf/rand)+0.05),100); 
  
figure (7) 
  
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centersd,(countsd/rand),'g'); 
title ('Failure Probability due to Mechanical Components') 
hold on 
plot (meanm(1),yd,'b'); 
hold on 
plot (PmRSdet(1),yd,'k'); 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centerse,(countse/rand),'y') 
hold on  
plot (meanm(2),ye,'b') 
hold on 
plot (PmRSdet(2),ye,'k') 
hold off 
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subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centersf,(countsf/rand),'r') 
hold on  
plot (meanm(3),yf,'b') 
hold on 
plot (PmRSdet(3),yf,'k') 
hold off 
 
% Probability of release from pressurized tank 
 
PRS1=PeqRS1+PmRS1-(PeqRS1.*PmRS1); 
PRS2=PeqRS2+PmRS2-(PeqRS2.*PmRS2); 
PRS3=PeqRS3+PmRS3-(PeqRS3.*PmRS3); 
P=[PRS1 PRS2 PRS3]; 
meanP=mean(P); 
  
% Deterministic approach 
PRS1det=PeqRS1det+PmRS1det-(PeqRS1det*PmRS1det); 
PRS2det=PeqRS2det+PmRS2det-(PeqRS2det*PmRS2det); 
PRS3det=PeqRS3det+PmRS3det-(PeqRS3det*PmRS3det); 
PRSdet=[PRS1det PRS2det PRS3det]; 
  
[counts1,centers1] = hist(PRS1,20); 
[counts2,centers2] = hist(PRS2,20); 
[counts3,centers3] = hist(PRS3,20); 
  
y1=linspace(0,(max(counts1/rand)+0.05),100); 
y2=linspace(0,(max(counts2/rand)+0.05),100); 
y3=linspace(0,(max(counts3/rand)+0.05),100); 
  
figure (8) 
  
subplot(3,1,1) 
bar(centers1,(counts1/rand),'g') 
title ('Probability of top-event') 
hold on  
plot (meanP(1),y1,'b') 
hold on 
plot (PRSdet(1),y1,'k') 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,2) 
bar(centers2,(counts2/rand),'y') 
hold on  
plot (meanP(2),y2,'b') 
hold on 
plot (PRSdet(2),y2,'k') 
hold off 
 
subplot(3,1,3) 
bar(centers3,(counts3/rand),'r') 
hold on  
plot (meanP(3),y3,'b') 
hold on 
plot (PRSdet(3),y3,'k') 
hold off
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